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ENERGY EQUITY FOR THE POOR: THE SEARCH
FOR FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL ENERGY ASSISTANCE
POLICY
Kenneth A. Manaster*
High energy costs present serious financial problems for many Amer-
icans. These problems have become especially acute since 1973, when
an embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) triggered a sharp increase in petroleum prices.' The federal
government's recently completed decontrol of oil prices, and the phased
decontrol of natural gas prices now under way,2 promise that energy
prices will continue to rise in coming years. Although temporary reduc-
tions in energy price levels may sometimes occur, such as the recent
decline in petroleum prices, 3 the overall movement since 1973 has been,
and is likely to continue to be, relentlessly upward.
The greatest hardships from increased energy costs fall on poor
people and on those who live on fixed incomes, such as retired persons.4
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1. H. KENDALL & S. NADIS, ENERGY STRATEGIES: TowARDS A SOLAR FUTURE 6
(1980) (oil prices quadrupled as a result of the embargo). See Hall & Pindyck, What To Do
When Energy Prices Rise Again, 65 PUB. INTEREST 59 (1981).
2. Decontrol of natural gas is occurring pursuant to the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (Supp. V 1981). President Reagan has recently proposed to
accelerate the decontrol of natural gas. S. 615, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH)
14,177 (1983). See [11 Curr. Rep.] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 261-62 (1983).
3. Abelson, Whither the Price of Oil?, 219 SCIENCE 1279, 1279 (1983).
4. See generally E. Grier, Colder... Darker: The Energy Crisis and Low-Income
Americans (report prepared for the Community Services Admin., 1977); E. Grier & G.
Grier, The Cost of Survival (report to the National Council of Senior Citizens and the
National Council of Churches, Oct. 1981); E. Grier & G. Grier, Poor + Old = Cold (report
to the National Council of Senior Citizens, Apr. 1981); FUEL OIL MARKETING ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY, LOW-INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE: A PROFILE OF
NEED AND POLICY OPTIONS (July 1980) [hereinafter cited as FOMAC REPORT]; H.
LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, HIGH ENERGY COSTS: UNEVEN, UNFAIR, UNAVOIDABLE?
(1981); National Council of Senior Citizens, Seared Hopes and Frozen Promises: The
Energy Care Report on Home Energy and the Elderly (July 30, 1982); National Economic
Development and Law Center, Perspectives on the Impact of Rising Energy Prices on the
Poor (report on Symposium on Energy Prices and the Poor, Berkeley, Cal. Feb. 28-29,
1980); STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 97TH CONG., 2D SEsS.,
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Programs designed to alleviate these hardships are frequently based on
the goal of "equity,"'5 the development of policies that will provide fair
treatment for poor Americans faced with rising energy costs. 6
Although "equity" or "fairness" toward the poor is a widely agreed-
upon goal, no one has yet developed a clear definition of these terms in
the context of energy policy for the poor.7 This lack of understanding of
what energy equity means has created confusion in the objectives, as
well as the methods, of the recent government efforts purporting to serve
the broad equity goal.
During the past decade the federal government has pursued the goal
of energy equity through two principal approaches:' programs for the
"winterization" or "weatherization" of the residences of poor people,9
OIL PRICE DECONTROL AND THE POOR: A SOCIAL POLICY FAILURE (Comm. Print 1982);
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982)
[hereinafter cited as ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY]; see also S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS
IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1980's 75 (1980) ("By 1980, home energy costs for a low-
income household represented about 20 percent of their entire income compared to 7
percent for the average American household."); R. PERLMAN & R. WARREN, FAMILIES IN
THE ENERGY CmsIS: IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY 131-142 (1977).
5. Cose, Introduction, ENERGY AND EQUITY: SOME SOCIAL CONCERNS v-viii (E.
Cose ed.) (1979); H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, supra note 4, at 8-12. See also, SYRACUSE
RESEARCH CENTER, MATCHING BENEFITS TO NEEDS: PLANNING FOR EQUITY IN ENERGY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1981).
6. In theory it may be possible to stem or reverse the tide of increasing fuel prices
by returning to some price regulation scheme. Few advocate this approach nowadays for
at least three reasons: (1) higher energy prices are widely considered to be a good thing
for the promotion of domestic energy production; (2) higher energy prices are believed to
inhibit energy consumption, i.e., to promote energy conservation; (3) the Reagan Admin-
istration's emphasis on deregulation and reliance on free market forces makes renewed
energy price regulation politically improbable. See H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, supra
note 4, at 60-61. But see R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE
ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 9-10, 56-78 (1981) (questioning the
actual extent to which decontrolled oil and gas prices will increase domestic production).
7. Several commentators have declared the need for such a definition. See sources
cited supra note 5.
8. An additional approach is to modify various rates and practices of regulated energy
utilities in order to lower rates for needy households, to allow averaged or deferred payment
plans, and to avoid abrupt terminations of service. Cf. Memphis Light, Gas, & Water
Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (municipal utility's termination procedures held to
violate due process); H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, supra note 4, at 61-63 (evaluation of
"lifeline rates").
Many of the regulated energy utilities have also recently begun their own financial
assistance programs to help poor customers pay their bills. These efforts usually combine
corporate contributions with voluntary contributions from other customers; frequently a
utility's program is administered in coordination with an established charitable service
organization. See Utilities, Customers Chip In to Help Needy Pay for Heat, L. A. Times,
Jan. 30, 1983, at 1 col. 5. Some utilities, under the supervision of state regulatory commis-
sions, are also subsidizing conservation measures for low-income customers. See Roe,
Utilities and the Poor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1983, at 27, col. 3.
9. See infra text accompanying note 36. See also A. COHEN & K. HOLLENBECK,
ENERGY ASSISTANCE SCHEMES: REVIEW, EVALUATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 58-74
(Prepared for High Energy Costs: The Differential Impact, Resources for the Future -
Brookings Conference, Oct. 9-10, 1980, revised Jan. 21, 1981).
[Vol. 7:371
HeinOnline  -- 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.  372 1983
Energy for the Poor
and programs of "direct assistance" or "energy assistance." In most
weatherization programs, the government provides insulating materials
and arranges for their installation.10 These structural changes can help
permanently decrease home heating costs to poor owners and renters,
although they do not directly address other types of energy needs such
as lighting, cooking, and transportation."l Weatherization programs have
significantly improved energy efficiency in participating residences,
though federal funds for these programs have been limited and only a
small percentage of qualifying residences has been weatherized.' 2
The direct assistance approach provides subsidies to the poor to help
them meet their energy needs. The principal forms of such subsidies are
cash payments to needy households and payments to the suppliers of
energy to such households. Additionally, some use has been made of "in
kind" assistance, such as blankets and warm clothing.13 Because of their
more immediate and visible results, direct assistance programs have
received a much higher level of federal funding than have weatherization
efforts.
14
A variety of policy choices has shaped direct assistance programs
through the past decade. An examination of the premises on which these
programs rest is essential for understanding and evaluating the direct
assistance efforts. Analysis of these premises also helps to provide a
conceptual framework in which to determine the best legislative ap-
proaches for the future.
This article attempts to provide such an analysis. Part I briefly
explores the implicit and explicit policy premises that have motivated
federal energy assistance legislation.' 5 Part II discusses four chronologi-
cal phases in energy assistance programs: 1973-79, 1980, 1981, and 1982-
present. Part III re-examines the policy premises in depth, and concludes
that the concept of energy equity entails multiple, overlapping objectives
that both justify energy assistance to the poor and help to delineate its
scope and form. Finally, Part IV offers a recommended synthesis of these
premises for future policy design.
10. CONSUMER ENERGY COUNCIL OF AMERICA, A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF Low INCOME WEATHERIZATION AND ITS POTENTIAL RE-
LATIONSHIP TO Low INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE 9-15 (1981).
11. See FOMAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 52-61; see generally A. COHEN & K.
HOLLENBECK, supra note 9.
12. See FOMAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 52-61; see also Ferrey, Solar Banking:
Constructing New Solutions to the Urban Energy Crisis, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 483 (1981).
13. See infra text accompanying note 40.
14. National Council of Senior Citizens, supra note 4, at 24 n.22 (for fiscal years 1981
and 1982, appropriations for energy assistance exceeded $1.8 billion, while those for weath-
erization were less than $200 million).
15. This article emphasizes federal direct assistance programs because few policy
deliberations have focused on weatherization. Even if it is determined that weatherization
offers the best long-term hope for the poor, there will still be some pressure for interim aid
to alleviate present hardships. As is noted above, see supra text accompanying note 11,
conservation programs also leave some energy needs untouched. There thus probably will
be a continuing need for direct assistance regardless of future weatherization programs.
1983]
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE POLICY PREMISES OF ENERGY ASSISTANCE
Looking at the decade of developments in energy assistance policy,
we can identify six underlying premises at work. The influence of the
different premises has varied considerably from one year to the next,
and some have had greater overall influence than others. Part of the
confusion that has characterized the programs has arisen because these
various premises have been pursued simultaneously, without any ac-
knowledgement of their tensions and inconsistencies.
Two of the underlying policy premises are most fundamental: first,
the need to alleviate poverty, and second, the need to alleviate hardships
caused by deliberate energy policy choices. The other four premises are
more instrumental in character; they relate largely, though not exclu-
sively, to how and when energy assistance efforts should be undertaken.
These four are the need to protect Americans from foreign price control,
to redistribute undeservedly high profits, to allocate social welfare deci-
sions to the local level, and to balance alleviation of current needs with
maximum long-term reduction of need.
These six policy premises have been applied at different times, in
different measures, and in different combinations in the energy assistance
programs from 1973 through 1982. Each of them has important, distinc-
tive implications for the design of energy assistance. After examining the
energy assistance programs of the last decade, this article will more
closely examine these premises and will offer a suggested synthesis.
Ii. A DECADE OF ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
A. 1973-1979
1. 1973-1974
The 1973-74 OPEC oil embargo, and the accompanying shortages
and price shock, provided the impetus for the first federal government
efforts at energy assistance for the poor.16 From that time through fiscal
year 1979, most program design was undertaken by administrative agen-
cies, most notably the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) 17 and its
successor agency, the Community Services Administration (CSA). Con-
gress provided some statutory guidance, but most of the ideas were
generated within this "war on poverty" bureaucracy. The people most
evidently hurt by the rapid price increases were the poor, and the most
visible and readily apparent vehicle for delivering direct assistance to
them seemed to be the existing institutions devoted to the war on poverty.
16. See infra text accompanying note 22.
17. OEO was the central federal agency in the anti-poverty campaign begun in the
early 1960's. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508
(1965), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (1981).
[Vol. 7:371
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In 1973 and 1974 Congress took no action aimed at helping the low
income energy consumer. OEO, however, did take some small steps. In
establishing OEO, Congress had included among its goals "opening to
everyone the opportunity to live in decency and dignity.' 8 Apparently
in pursuit of decent living conditions for the poor, OEO in 1973 and 1974
used the authority granted it by the Economic Opportunity Act to support
demonstrations of ways to cope with increased energy costs to the poor
and the elderly.19
Much of the work of the war on poverty was designed and executed
through Community Action Agencies (CAAs), local organizations that
were required to include extensive participation by the poor themselves .20
A few local energy programs were initiated through CAAs. 21 One
congressional committee later described the early efforts, albeit with
some exaggeration:
Upon its own initiative and using previously appropriated funds, OEO/CSA
originated a comprehensive weatherization and energy-saving program for
the poor at the time of the fuel crisis in 1973 .... The agency later initiated
an energy voucher subsidy program to test this method of providing the
poor with money to buy fuel. Revolving loan funds, crisis centers, and
emergency fuel depots were also set up by CAA's.22
The initial federal involvement in direct assistance thus was limited to
funding some local efforts. In retrospect, the logic of this approach is
clear: the hardship to the poor was most evident to the poor themselves
and to the agencies seeking to serve their needs. OEO, state poverty
agencies, and the CAAs could begin to do something without the creation
of any new bureaucracy and without any new authority or funding from
Congress. 23
2. 1975
Early in 1975 Congress explicitly addressed the energy needs of low
income Americans by passing the Headstart, Economic Opportunity, and
Community Partnership Act of 1974.24 The Act renamed OEO as the
Community Services Administration, 25 and created a new Emergency
Energy Conservation Services (EECS) program under the authority of
18. Id.
19. See S. REP. No. 434, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1979); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 1075.1-
7(b) (1973) (special research and demonstration programs funded by OEO).
20. Economic Opportunity Act, supra note 17, §§ 201, 210, 78 Stat. at 516, 519.
21. See FOMAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 24. As early as the winter of 1973-74, for
example, such programs were underway in Wisconsin and Maine. S. Rm,. No. 434, supra
note 19, at 7.
22. S. REP. No. 982, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
23. S. REP No. 434, supra note 19, at 6-7.
24. Pub. L. No. 93-644, 88 Stat. 2291, 2308 (1975), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Headstart Act].
25. See id. § 601, 88 Stat. at 2310.
1983]
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the Director of CSA. 26 As the program name indicates, major emphasis
was given to conservation. 27 However, the legislation also authorized
emergency loans, grants, and revolving funds to respond to increased
housing expenses resulting from energy price hikes.28 It also authorized
CSA assistance for programs involving
alternative fuel supplies, special fuel voucher or stamp programs; ...
alternative transportation activities designed to save fuel and assure con-
tinued access to training, education, and employment; [and] ... nutrition,
health, and other supportive services in emergency cases. 29
Three features of the statute are especially noteworthy. First, it
focused upon not only the needs of the poor, but also the needs of the
elderly and the near poor,30 thus requiring at least three levels of admin-
istrative line-drawing. Second, it included no authorization for cash pay-
ments to these energy consumers; instead it allowed more indirect types
of assistance, such as alternative supplies, vouchers, or stamps. Third,
it recognized the transportation needs of the poor, at least for the limited
purpose of continued access to training, education, and employment.3"
Some members of Congress anticipated an annual appropriation of
about $100 million per year for the EECS program for fiscal years 1975
through 1977.32 They also expressed concern "about the effect of the
energy crisis on the poor during the winter months, and the special
hardships which the poor will face this winter [1974-75] as a result of the
economic situation. '33 Despite this concern, Congress did not appropriate
funds for the EECS program until June, 1975 and then only appropriated
$16.5 million for fiscal 1975, ending September 30, 1975. 31
26. Id. § 5(c), 88 Stat. at 2294-95.
27. Emphasis was placed on enabling "low-income individuals and families, including
the elderly and the near poor, to participate in energy conservation programs designed to
lessen the impact of the high cost of energy on such individuals and families and to reduce
individual and family energy consumption." Headstart Act, supra note 24, § 5(c), 88 Stat.
at 2294-95.
28. Id.; see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, LOW-INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 45 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CBO REPORT].
29. Headstart Act, supra note 24, § 5(c), 88 Stat. at 2294-95.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. S. REP. No. 1292, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974).
33. Id. at 12.
34. Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-32, 89 Stat.
173, 181 (1975). See also S. REP. No. 434, supra note 19, at 10; 40 Fed. Reg. 31,602 (1975).
The legislative history of the appropriations bill foreshadows some of the thorny issues
which have persisted through the various phases of energy assistance. One such issue is
the extent to which funds actually reach needy consumers, rather than end up contributing
to expanded bureaucracy. In considering the 1975 funding, the Senate Appropriations
Committee declared its intention "that this appropriation be used for winterization and
financial relief of the poor and near poor, not for expansion of administrative machinery."
The Committee directed that "[n]o Federal employees should be added and local agency
[Vol. 7:371
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Enactment and funding of the EECS program paved the way for the
promulgation of the first set of administrative regulations on energy as-
sistance. 35 Those regulations set forth the purposes of the EECS program
as follows: "[T]he long-range goal is to conserve energy and lessen the
impact of the high cost of fuel for poor people, particularly through
programs to increase the thermal efficiency of their dwellings .... "36 In
addition, the EECS program would cover "emergency cases calling for
programs of crisis intervention to restore utility service or prevent cutoff,
provide emergency fuel deliveries or support other activities to assist
those suffering serious hardships which endanger their health ....
This statement envisions a narrow role for direct assistance, limiting
it to "emergency cases" to prevent danger to health or interruption of
energy delivery. Arguably this focus would not include poor energy
consumers who reallocated their meager resources in such a way as to
avoid cutoffs or energy-related health threats, yet who suffered from this
reallocation in other ways.3 8 Direct assistance was referred to in the
regulations as emergency assistance, and defined as "intervention to
prevent hardship or danger to health due to utility shut-off or lack of
fuel. ' 39 Energy assistance included "grants, loans, or payment guaran-
tees; mediation with a utility company or fuel supplier and financial
counseling; and maintenance of emergency fuel supplies, warm clothing,
and blankets. ' 40 CSA thus interpreted Congress's mandate for direct
assistance as essentially limited to life-threatening, emergency situa-
tions. In view of the limited appropriation Congress had made, any
attempt to establish a more comprehensive program would have been
financially doomed from the start.41
administrative costs should not exceed 10 percent." S. REP. No. 137, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
51(1975).
Another difficult issue was determining which type of federal agency was most ap-
propriate for dealing with the energy needs of the poor. As noted regarding the 1973-74
efforts, the anti-poverty agency and its local off-shoots seemed to be a logical starting
place. But by 1975 the federal energy policy apparatus was taking shape. The Conference
Committee Report on the appropriation thus saw fit to direct CSA to "coordinate with
services of the Federal Energy Administration" in administering the EECS program. H.R.
REP. No. 239, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1975).
35. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,602 (1975) (originally codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.30-1 to -10
(1975)) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Regulations]. These regulations were occasionally referred
to as CSA Instruction 6143-1. Although promulgated by CSA, the regulations were de-
scribed as the result of consultation between CSA and the Federal Energy Administration.
40 Fed. Reg. 31,602-03 (1975) (preamble to proposed regulations).
36. 1975 Regulations, supra note 35, § 1061.30-3, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,603.
37. Id.
38. The bulk of the regulations explained the process by which CSA would grant
funds to CAAs and other public or private non-profit organizations and agencies for "win-
terization" or "emergency assistance" programs. The regulations drew the eligibility line
for "near poor" recipients at 125% of the poverty thresholds set by CSA. Id. § 1061.30-5,
40 Fed. Reg. at 31,603.
39. Id. § 1061.30-6, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,603.
40. Id.
41. Most of the total $44 million appropriated for the EECS program in 1975 and
1976 was used for weatherization. See S. REP. No. 434, supra note 19, at 10.
1983]
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3. 1976
Congress took no action on energy assistance in 1976 other than to
appropriate $27.5 million for it.42 In the absence of any substantive
congressional statements on the subject, CSA had no apparent reason to
change its 1975 EECS program regulations. Yet in July 1976 CSA did
revise them, claiming that experience had indicated the need to clarify
agency policy.43 In addition to some minor reworking of the statement of
EECS program purposes, the revision included an ambitious addition to
that statement: that the program was to assure "participation of the poor
and near poor in the decision making processes that will determine the
pricing structures and availability of increasingly scarce energy re-
sources." 44 The major emphasis remained on what were now called
"weatherization" projects, rather than "winterization" as in 1975; "crisis
intervention" fully supplanted the earlier "emergency assistance" label. 45
Even though CSA asserted that it was making no major substantive
changes, the 1976 revisions did implicitly broaden the program. First,
the change to "weatherization" allowed the possibility of assistance to
persons suffering from heat rather than cold; in fact, the regulations did
mention weatherization work related to "heating or cooling. '46 Second,
the addition of "fuel voucher or stamp programs expanded the possible
components of crisis intervention projects. '47 This addition simply put
into the regulations methods which were expressly mentioned in the
EECS statute itself in 1975, but which were omitted from the earlier
regulations. The additions tended to give the crisis intervention approach
a somewhat broader perspective.
This broadening was also reflected in a new definition of crisis in-
tervention as "immediate, short-term assistance, consisting of interven-
tion to prevent hardship or danger to health due to utility shut-off or lack
of fuel. ' 48 The provision also stated that such intervention "should be
42. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-206, 90 Stat. 3, 22 (1976); Second Supplemental Appropriation Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-303, 90 Stat. 597 (1976). See H.R. REP. No. 689, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 18
(1975). The $16.5 million appropriated in 1975 had not been available in time to help with
winter needs in 1974-75. At one point, the Senate Appropriations Committee was inclined
to add $38.5 million to that amount, thus producing $55 million for use in the winter of
1975-76. See S. REP. No. 366, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94 (1975). Ultimately only half this
$38 million amount was agreed upon. See S. REP. No. 434, supra note 19, at 10.
43. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,125 (1976), amending 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.30-1 to -14 (1982).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.30-6 (1982), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,125 (1976).
45. Id. §§ 1061.30-9(a), 1061.30-9(b), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
46. Id. § 1061-30-10(c)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,127.
47. Id. § 1061-30-9, 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
48. Id. § 1061.30-10(d)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,127. Another new feature that suggests
the broader significance of energy assistance was the inclusion of "consumer information,
education, and legal assistance" projects among the activities eligible for CSA grants under
the EECS program. Such projects could include "the representation of the interests of the
poor in public proceedings involving, for example, energy policy and utility rate structures."
Id. § 1061.30-9, 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
[Vol. 7:371
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followed with program efforts that will have a long-range effect on the
individual's ability to conserve energy and pay fuel bills. '49
Lest it be thought that crisis intervention was to be transformed into
an on-going benefits program for the poor, however, the regulations
hastened to add:
In any case, actual payment of utility or fuel bills by this program should
be a one-time crisis intervention resource to be considered only as a last
resort after negotiation with utility or fuel companies; and care must be
taken to avoid having the grants looked upon as a source of on-going
subsidy for energy costs of the poorso
The regulations thus touched upon the desirability of long-term energy
assistance, while expressing fear of an "on-going subsidy for energy costs
of the poor." In this ambivalence, we find the first hint that major ques-
tions of income redistribution might be involved in energy assistance
programs.
In addition to expanding the scope of crisis intervention, the regu-
lations acknowledged for the first time that some poor people rent their
dwellings, rather than own them.5 1 This was done only with respect to
weatherization projects. No attention was given to the problems involved
in direct assistance when renters and landlords have various kinds of
arrangements for paying fuel bills.
Unlike the regulations for the preceding year, the 1976 regulations
recognized the transportation needs of the poor.5 2 The revision defined
as eligible activities those "designed to offset the increased costs to the
poor of transportation needed for access to essential services and em-
ployment. '53 This language is even broader than the statutory focus upon
"access to training, education, and employment," 54 and suggests that
CSA was beginning to think that energy needs extended beyond the
objectives of the poverty program itself. Again, however, CSA was re-
luctant to go too far. The regulations cautioned that "projects designed
to provide assistance in the purchasing of [transportation] fuel shall do
so only as a last resort, thereby minimizing the subsidy of high cost
fuel., 55
Finally, the revisions included a provision for projects for developing
alternate energy sources to meet the energy needs of the poor. 5 6 The
49. Id. § 1061.30-10(d)(1), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,127.
50. Id. § 1061.30-10(d)(2), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,127. It is difficult to know what kinds
of "program efforts that will have a long-range effect" could be undertaken under the first
provision after reading the second. The single possibility would seem to be weatherization,
which deals only with the home heating and cooling aspects of energy consumption.
51. Id. §§ 1061.30-10(c)(2), -10(c)(3), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126-27.
52. Id. § 1061.30-9(d), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
53. Id.
54. Headstart Act, supra note 24, § 5(c), 88 Stat. at 2295.
55. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.30-10(f), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
56. The regulations referred generally to "technology that capitalizes on non-fossil
1983]
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striking thing about this provision was that it was to be implemented by
CSA and its state and local grantees, raising again the question of the
most appropriate type and level of government agency for dealing with
energy needs of the poor. 57
These developments in 1976 suggest that members of Congress and
some CSA officials were beginning to recognize that the energy problems
of the poor might call for more than just weatherization and the provision
of some emergency financial aid.
4. 1977
In April of 1977 President Carter presented the first National Energy
Plan, which declared that "[g]ovemment at all levels has the responsi-
bility for protecting low-income citizens from the most severe effects of
the energy crisis. '58 To provide this protection, the Plan relied upon the
weatherization program, among other methods.5 9 To deal with the harm
to low-income people resulting from sharp energy price increases, the
President stated that he was submitting a revised emergency assistance
program to Congress, 60 but noted that "[flor the longer run, protection
for low-income people from the gradually increasing cost of energy, lies
in a reformed welfare system .... ,,61
In response to this presidential initiative, Congress appropriated $200
million for a Crisis Intervention Program to be administered by CSA as
part of its Emergency Energy Conservation Service (EECS) program for
fiscal 1977.62 Activities under this appropriation were referred to as the
fuels and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power or methane digesters;
or that can make conventional fuels available to the poor at substantially decreased cost
and/or increased efficiency." Id. § 1061.30-9(e), 41 Fed. Reg. at 29,126.
57. Actually the Senate committee considering the 1976 EECS appropriation had
recommended that up to $3 million of EECS funds be used by CSA for a National Center
of Appropriate Technology, whose primary purpose would "be to work with Community
Action Agencies and other appropriate local groups to develop and implement innovative
energy technology and energy systems appropriate to the needs of the elderly, poor, and
near poor." S. REP. No. 366, supra note 42, at 94. Whether this type of research and
development effort should be undertaken by an agency such as CSA, as opposed to a
technical, energy-oriented agency, is open to question.
58. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 566, 577 (Apr. 20, 1977).
59. Id. Ironically, in view of the President's own later proposals for decontrolling oil
prices, see infra text accompanying notes 136-40, the President cited price controls on
natural gas and oil as means to "protect low-income consumers whose homes are heated"
with each of these fuels. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 566, 577 (Apr. 20, 1977). This
reference, however, was not present in the Plan as presented to Congress nine days later.
60. 13 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. at 578.
61. Id. at 577.
62. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat. 61, 78 (1977). This
appropriation was in addition to another $110 million Congress appropriated for fiscal 1977
for the weatherization component of the EECS program. Departments of Labor and Health,
Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434
(1976); see S. REp. No. 64, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1977); see also S. REP. No. 434,
supra note 19, at 10.
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Special Crisis Intervention Program (SCIP).6 3 SCIP was intended to pro-
vide "emergency energy/fuel assistance" pursuant to the original EECS
program statutory authority.64
CSA did not issue any new regulations for SCIP, but instead contin-
ued to operate on the basis of the 1976 regulations. 65 In administering
the program, CSA apparently took into account the views expressed in
the Senate Report on the Appropriations Bill. 6 That report gave CSA
more detailed program guidance, which seemed to begin to remove the
effort from the usual poverty program format by frequently interposing
congressional directives and state government agencies between CSA
and the local grantees.
Specifically, the Report directed that funds that could not effectively
be spent for crisis intervention could be utilized for weatherization. 67 It
also included the first reference to an allocation formula for the division
of the $200 million among the states. 68 The Report also urged the local
administering agencies to "give particular consideration to those cases in
which emergency assistance can be coordinated with weatherization as-
sistance." 69 Payments under SCIP were also declared not to constitute
income for purposes of determining eligibility for income maintenance
programs such as public assistance or food stamps. 70
In addition, the Senate Report stated that grants should be provided
to the states, which were to distribute the funds through CAAs and other
appropriate state and local groups in the public or private sector.7I As in
63. CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 45. See also STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
APPROPRIATIONS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMINIS-
TRATION ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR 1977 AND 1978 (Comm. Print 1979).
64. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101.
65. Late in 1976 CSA did promulgate procedures for CSA grantees to follow in
submitting required data on the services provided. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,876 (1976) (CSA In-
struction 6143-2).
66. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, "82 percent of the funds available were obligated under SCIP, and over one million
households received benefits that averaged an estimated $140." CBO REPORT, supra note
28, at 46. But see STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 63, at ii
("The proportion of funds spent to funds allocated has little value when trying to determine
if the programs have truly served those intended. An analysis of program statistics coupled
with CSA's inability to provide more definitive data seems to indicate otherwise."). A brief
discussion of the non-binding nature of congressional reports may be found in Simer v.
Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 690 (7th Cir. 1981) (Swygert, J., dissenting.)
67. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101.
68. Id. The formula contained four components - "heating degree days" squared,
the number of poverty households, the number of people over 65 with incomes below 125%
of the poverty level, and the relative cost of fuel in the region. Heating degree days are
the number of degrees the daily average temperature is below 65 degrees Fahrenheit. CBO
REPORT, supra note 28, at 37 n.8. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 4485, n.2 (1979).
69. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101. Although the Report did not define
coordination, one might assume that the intent was to assist households interested in
weatherization, perhaps by means of giving temporary assistance to meet their energy
needs until weatherization reduced those needs.
70. Id. at 102.
71. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101.
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1976, eligibility was restricted to individuals with incomes no higher than
125% of the federal poverty guidelines. 72 Payments under the program
could not exceed $250 per household.73 Governors of states receiving
grants were to assure that the greatest household needs were met first.
The preferred form of assistance under SCIP was direct payments
to energy or fuel suppliers, on behalf of eligible individuals who proved
their inability to meet outstanding bills, as well as those who had paid
their bills "at great sacrifice. 74 In addition, cash grants of up to $50 could
be made directly to a household if the administering agency found that
there was an energy-related need that could be met in no other way.75
Renters who paid for home energy indirectly through their rent, however,
were not eligible for benefits. 76
Despite the additional funding and guidance, SCIP was fundamen-
tally a continuation of the earlier crisis intervention efforts, particularly
in its continued uncertainty over the relative emphasis to be given to the
various components of the EECS authority. In part this extended the
original EECS approach of allowing local CAAs to determine the best
uses of funds. Under SCIP Congress still contemplated that local agencies
could decide how much of their grants could "be effectively spent for
crisis intervention," with the rest used for weatherization. 77
5. 1978
Although Congress enacted a few minor amendments to the EECS
program statute in November 1978,78 in most respects the program con-
tinued along the same lines as in 1977. Congress appropriated $65 million
for EECS, which was intended primarily for weatherization projects. 79
CSA continued to rely upon its 1976 regulations in administering EECS
activities.80
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Apart from this exception, CSA decided "that the only form of money assis-
tance that should be allowed was a voucher system with vouchers redeemable for fuel or
other needed goods or services." COMMUNITY SERVICES ADMIN., RESPONSE TO THE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS COMM. REPORT ON THE ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 2 (April 10,
1979).
76. CBO REPORT, supra note 23, at 45.
77. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 62, at 101.
78. See Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-568, 92 Stat.
2425 (1978), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (1981). One provision of
the amendments stated that "[e]ligibility for any of the programs authorized under this
section shall not be based solely on delinquency in payment of fuel bills." Id. § 5(d), 92
Stat. at 2426-27. This addition presumably was intended to remove any incentive for
recipients of energy assistance to refrain from paying fuel bills in order to qualify for federal
help. At about the same time, Congress also enacted the package of five statutes known
collectively as the National Energy Act. Pub. L. Nos. 95-617 to -621, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
79. S. REP. No. 434, supra note 19, at 10.
80. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.30-1 to 1061.30-14 (1982), 41 Fed. Reg. 29,125 (1976).
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In March 1978, CSA promulgated additional regulations, which re-
ferred to the Emergency Energy Conservation Service as the Emergency
Energy Conservation Program. The regulations principally addressed the
allocation of the funds.81 For the first time, CSA formally set out the
formula it was using in allocating funds to the states.8 2 CSA also stated
that Emergency Energy Conservation Program Plans, which had been
developed by each state's economic opportunity office, would form the
basis for each state's use of 1978 funds unless the states and CSA agreed
on plan amendments.8 3 The states had developed these plans jointly with
the CAAs and regional CSA offices for using the 1977 funds. 4 The
development of such plans reflects growing state involvement in distrib-
uting funds, subject to federal supervision. Grantees were encouraged to
develop proposals for comprehensive energy conservation programs that
could include not only weatherization but also crisis intervention, con-
servation education, alternate energy, and other activities. 85 In essence,
CSA was reiterating its "flexible funding" orientation, leaving it to the
states and local grantees to choose the best uses of funds. 86 The new
regulations, however, do not provide a clear sense of the program at that
time or of how CSA perceived its function. 7
81. 43 Fed. Reg. 9818 (1978) (amending 45 C.F.R. § 1061.30-11(b) and adding 45
C.F.R. §§ 1061.52-1 to -9) [hereinafter cited as 1978 EECP Regulations]. CSA stated its
intent to allocate about $40 million of its $65 million appropriation immediately, along with
almost $37 million of unobligated SCIP funds from the prior year, for a total of $77 million
to be made available for grants. The remaining $25 million was to be set aside for farm-
worker energy programs ($4 million), Native American energy programs ($3 million), other
projects ($2.1 million), and future plans not yet prepared ($16 million). Id. § 1061.52-8, 43
Fed. Reg. at 9819.
82. The allocation formula assumed that each local project would receive a base
amount of $18,000, which would be used to hire supervisory personnel for each project.
45 C.F.R §§ 1061.52-7(b) to -7(c), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9819. The remaining funds were then
allocated in accordance with the following formula: (0.587 x population-weighted heating
degree days + 0.033 x population-weighted cooling degree days) x (number of poverty
households in the State + number of elderly below 125 percent of poverty threshold). The
resulting number for each state was next "divided by the total of such numbers for all
States, yielding a percentage which was applied to the balance available after subtraction
of the sum of the per-project allotments." Id. §§ 1061.52-8(d) to -8(e), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9819.
Appended to the regulation was a list of amounts to be allocated to each state from the
almost $77 million.
83. 45 C.F.R §§ 1061.52-2(a) to -2(b), 1061.52-4, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9818.
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1061.52-3(a), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9818. The new regulations instructed eligible
grantees to continue to submit proposals according to the provisions of the 1976 regulations.
Id. § 1061.52-4(b), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9818.
86. Id. § 1061.52-3(b), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9818.
87. On the one hand, both the new regulations and the old ones emphasize weath-
erization projects. Both also recognize, however, that grantees may wish to devote some
of their funds to projects other than weatherization, including crisis intervention. It is
striking in this regard that the new promulgation recites that "the fiscal year 1977 level of
funding increased the size of the Emergency Energy Conservation Program four-fold." Id.
§ 1061.52-6, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9818. This refers to the jump from $27.5 million in 1976 to
$110 million in 1977 for weatherization; it does not pertain to SCIP. However, as pointed
19831
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In addition to these revised EECP regulations, CSA also issued
regulations governing a new Emergency Energy Assistance Program
(EEAP).88 The new program, for which Congress had just appropriated
$200 million,89 provided crisis intervention funds for 1978.90 During 1978,
then, CSA executed both the EECP and EEAP programs pursuant to the
statutory authority for the EECS program first enacted in 1975. The
EECP program was administered through states and local grantees, with
the principal emphasis on weatherization, even though a substantial quan-
tity of the funds to be used for this came from the unused 1977 SCIP
amounts.91 The supplemental EEAP funds of $200 million were to be
distributed to the same grantees as the EECP funds, but with the addition
of some new requirements.
The EEAP regulations contained a number of novel features. First,
the regulations went to great lengths to establish the program's non-
precedential nature, describing it as a one-time program that "is not
intended to be an income transfer program; nor does it entitle any person
or household to a certain amount and/or form of assistance." 92 The reg-
ulations narrowed the circumstances under which funds could be ex-
pended by requiring that there be an "Energy Related Emergency" in the
recipient state or locality that "creates a need for direct assistance and
which exceeds presently available resources." 93 The regulations specified
in detail the kinds of circumstances that would qualify as Energy Related
Emergencies, emphasizing danger to health or severe hardship because
of inadequate fuel or energy supply.94 Finally the rule provided that, "as
in the past, cash assistance will be limited to voucher payments and
payments directly to suppliers of fuel or other assistance." 95
The EEAP regulations also explicitly limited eligibility. No one could
receive EEAP assistance if other support services, such as welfare, could
meet the need. 96 The regulations clarified previous income eligibility
out above, almost $37 million of unobligated SCIP funds were redirected to the 1978
Emergency Energy Conservation Program. See supra note 81. Thus, of the $77 million
being made available initially for 1978 by CSA for the "conservation" program, $37 million
were funds Congress had appropriated for crisis intervention. On its face there was nothing
wrong with this result, especially given that SCIP was intended to allow funds to be diverted
to weatherization if they could not effectively be spent for crisis intervention. Nothing
indicates, however, that clear policy choices actually were being articulated regarding the
redirection of these funds.
88. 43 Fed. Reg. 9476 (1978) (originally codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.51-1 to 1061.51-
14) [hereinafter cited as 1978 EEAP Regulations].
89. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-240, 92 Stat. 107, 112 (1978).
90. The EEAP regulations, which governed distribution of funds that Congress ap-
propriated on March 7, were issued on March 8, while the EECP revisions were issued on
March 10.
91. See supra note 87.
92. 1978 EEAP Regulations, supra note 88, § 1061.51-2, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9476.
93. Id. § 1061.51-3(a), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9476.
94. Id. 99 1061.51-3(a)(2), 1061.51-3(b), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9476.
95. Id. § 1061.51-5, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9477.
96. Id. § 1061.51-7, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9477.
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requirements for recipients, 97 and tightened program eligibility by requir-
ing that an applicant had to show that he or she lacked financial resources
to meet an emergency energy need.98
Apparently in recognition of problems associated with reprogram-
ming the 1977 SCIP funds, the regulations also required that EEAP funds
be returned to CSA for refund to the U.S. Treasury if they were not
obligated before the expiration date.99 That date, May 1, 1978,100 was a
controversial one, for it was well before the end of the fiscal year. CSA
attempted to justify that early date, which was not statutorily required,
by referring to "congressional intent that this program [operate] during
the winter months." 10 1 This cutoff date and some other features of the
EEAP regulations were challenged in litigation,102 and in September of
1978 a Federal District Court held that CSA had improperly declared the
early termination.10
3
6. 1979
In 1979 the overlapping weatherization efforts by CSA and the
Department of Energy (DOE) ended when DOE became the sole
97. Elderly persons were defined as those over age 60. Income limits for them were
raised from 125% of CSA Poverty Guidelines to 150%. Id. § 1061.51-7(b)(1), 43 Fed. Reg.
at 9477. These limits were subsequently returned to the 125% applicable to non-elderly low
income persons and households. 43 Fed. Reg. 14,317 (1978). Instead, elderly persons
receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) were eligible. Id.
98. 1978 EEAP Regulations, supra note 88, § 1061.51-7(b)(3), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9477.
The regulations also stated, "[a] person should be asked to provide proof of program
eligibility where the need can be documented (e.g. notice of disconnection, overdue fuel
bills, notice of refusal to deliver, etc.) If such documentation does not exist, it will be the
responsibility of the grantee to determine program eligibility." Id. This suggests a return to
a requirement that applicants must prove unpaid energy bills before qualifying for assis-
tance. The Congressional Budget Office described the 1978 EEAP program as one which,
"unlike its predecessor, permitted payments only on behalf of households with large unmet
home energy bills." CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 46. The regulations actually are more
flexible than this description suggests, but the emphasis on emergencies and on the need
to demonstrate that available resources are exceeded by energy needs does bespeak a shift
back to a stricter crisis assistance mode. In line with this, the $250 per household maximum
benefit limitation is reiterated. 1978 EEAP Regulations, supra note 88, § 1061.51-14(a), 43
Fed. Reg. at 9478. In contrast, however, the regulations do include an extensive list of
types of assistance permissible, such as "blankets and warm clothing, temporary loan of
space heaters, emergency furnace repairs, fuel oil delivery, temporary shelter, nutrition,
health and other supportive services,. . . as well as the payment of outstanding utility/fuel
bills ..... Id. § 1061.51-5, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9477.
99. 45 C.F.R § 1061.51-14(b)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. at 9478.
100. Id. § 1061-51.8.
101. 43 Fed. Reg. 9476 (supplementary information).
102. See Greig v. Olivarez, No. 78 C 1646 (N.D. Ill., filed April 27, 1978), discussed
in 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 138, 255, 373, 430 (discussing pre-trial procedures). On May
18, 1978, CSA did extend the program to May 20. 43 Fed. Reg. 21,461 (1978).
103. The court ordered the unspent funds, which amounted to over one-fourth of the
original EEAP funding, to be made available in fiscal 1979. Those funds were spent during
the first six month of fiscal 1979. CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 46; see also STAFF OF
THE Housn COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, supra note 63, at iii (questioning whether CSA
supported and tacitly approved the court action, rather than opposing it).
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administrator of that program.1 4 This change left energy assistance as
the central focus of CSA's activities, and CSA's continuing experimen-
tation with this program produced a number of new features in the fiscal
1979 program.
CSA promulgated its final rules for administering 1979 crisis inter-
vention funds10 5 on January 22 of that year.106 The regulations eliminated
the distinction between EEAP and EECP that had been in effect during
1978.107 In doing so, CSA left standing the basic 1976 EECS program
regulations and their reporting requirements.108 In discussing the pur-
poses of the program, CSA cited not only the EECS program legisla-
tion,'09 but also Congress's statement of purpose for community action
agencies and programs under the Economic Opportunity Act. 110 CSA
declared:
Activities initiated under [the Act] are also governed by the basic purpose
of Title II which is to ... stimulate a better focusing of all available local,
state, private, and federal resources upon the goal of enabling low-income
families, and low-income individuals of all ages, in rural and urban areas
to attain the skills, knowledge, and motivations and secure the opportunities
for them to become fully self-sufficient. These legislative goals were used
by CSA as the major guideline in developing the rule which will govern its
FY79 program to address poor people's winter-related energy emergencies.
CSA is not, and was not created to be, a Federal agency administering
income transfer programs, nor is the intent of its authorizing legislation
that any of its programs be such."'
It is curious that not until its fifth year of promulgating regulations on
this subject did CSA explicitly justify its efforts in terms of the basic
purposes of the poverty program's community action strategy. It is even
more curious that CSA would cite statutory objectives relating to "skills,
knowledge, and motivations" and "opportunities . .. to become fully
self-sufficient," since the energy assistance program CSA was adminis-
104. CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 55.
105. Congress again appropriated $200 million for crisis intervention to be adminis-
tered by CSA. Appropriations for Fiscal Year, 1979 - Continuance, Pub. L. No. 95-482,
92 Stat. 1603 (1978). See CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 46; S. REP. No. 434, supra note
19, at 8. In contrast to the late funding in most prior years, funds were available much
closer to the beginning of the winter heating season by virtue of this early Continuing
Resolution. See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,466 (Dec. 28, 1978).
106. 44 Fed. Reg. 4480 (1979) (amending 45 C.F.R. § 1061.52) [hereinafter cited as
1979 Regulations].
107. See infra note 114.
108. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.30 (1982), 41 Fed. Reg. 29,125 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 52,876
(1976) (originally codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1061.31).
109. Headstart Act, supra note 24, § 5(c), 88 Stat. at 2295.
110. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-341, § 2(a)(6), 90
Stat. 803 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 (1981).
111. 44 Fed. Reg. 4481 (1979) (preamble to 1979 Regulations).
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tering in 1979 seems to have very little to do with those goals. 112 Perhaps
self-sufficiency is served by weatherization efforts, which reduce de-
pendence on outside sources for energy. The irony is that in 1979, for
the first time, CSA was no longer involved with weatherization. A more
pertinent statutory objective would seem to be "the opportunity to live
in decency and dignity," 3 but CSA did not mention that.
The 1979 regulations continued to declare the same policy objectives
that had been stated for EEAP in 1978. CSA wanted to make funds
available for response to energy crises that endangered the health and
survival of low-income households.11 4 The 1979 regulations repeatedly
made clear that aid was only available for "winter-related energy
crises, 115 even though past regulations had acknowledged possible as-
sistance to persons suffering from extreme heat.
Because the regulations and funds were available relatively early in
the 1979 heating season," 6 CSA had the opportunity to devise a more
sophisticated, three-tiered strategy for allocating the crisis intervention
funds. CSA stressed its desire to encompass preventive activities in
addition to crisis intervention.1 7 CSA thus was prepared to use some of
its crisis intervention funds for energy needs not arising out of crises.
The non-crisis needs were covered by the first tier program, called
the Regular Crisis Intervention Program." 8 This program addressed the
needs of "areas of the country whose normal winter weather may be
severe enough" to cause energy-related winter emergencies." 9 Appendix
B to the regulations indicated that all but a few of the warmest states
would receive funds under this program. 120
112. Perhaps CSA was anticipating the strong criticism shortly thereafter to appear
in the report of House Appropriations Committee Staff, supra note 63. That report charged,
inter alia, that "SCIP and EEAP have in themselves created a sense of constituent depen-
dency." Id. at ii.
113. Equal Opportunity Act, supra note 17, § 2, 78 Stat. at 508.
114. 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.51-2, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4481. The 1979
policy statement closely tracks the language of the 1978 EEAP regulations. Compare 1979
Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-2, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4481 with 1978 EEAP Regulations,
supra note 88, § 1061.51-2, 43 Fed. Reg. at 9476. Other sections of the 1979 regulations
draw upon the 1978 EECP regulations. Thus the often confusing bifurcation of the EECS
program regulations which existed in 1978, see supra text accompanying notes 78-103,
mercifully was not perpetuated.
115. 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-2, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4481.
116. Congress appropriated the funds in early January. See supra note 105. As with
the 1978 program, and despite the litigation aimed at the May 1978 cut-off date, see supra
note 102, the 1979 regulations declared "[n]o grant funds may be committed by grantees to
provide assistance to ... households after May 31, 1979 .... All grants will have a
termination date of June 30, 1979." 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-4(b), -4(c),
44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
117. 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-5(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
118. Id. § 1061.52-7, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
119. Id. § 1061.52-5(b), -7(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
120. 44 Fed. Reg. 4485 (Appendix B to 1979 Regulations); see CBO REPORT, supra
note 28, at 46.
19831
HeinOnline  -- 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.  387 1983
Harvard Environmental Law Review
By means of the Regular Crisis program, CSA implicitly acknowl-
edged the predictable and on-going nature of the hardships many low-
income people face in normal winter weather given recent energy price
levels. This seemed to lay the conceptual foundation for an on-going
assistance program. CSA gave no indication of willingness to endorse
that step, however, and even explicitly denied that income transfer or
entitlement programs were created by its "one-time" allocations under
the Regular Crisis Intervention Program.' 2 '
The second tier of crisis intervention funding was the Supplemental
Crisis Intervention Program, which supplied one-time grants to states
and localities that could demonstrate a winter-related energy need. 122 The
regulations included a variety of alternative tests under which the gov-
ernor of a state could declare that a winter-related energy need existed,
either throughout the state or within a specified area. 23 CSA contem-
plated that funds under this program would provide supplementary as-
sistance when the normal hardships in cold winter locales were aggra-
vated by conditions such as unusually cold weather or sharp increases
in fuel or utility prices. 124
The third tier of aid was the Winter-Related Disaster Relief Program,
designed to provide short-term assistance to meet disaster-related energy
needs of the poor and the elderly. CSA wanted to ensure that low-income
persons' emergency energy needs, arising from winter-related disaster
conditions, were met pending receipt of other disaster-relief resources. 125
The regulations, however, did not clearly define such disasters to dis-
tinguish them from the winter-related energy needs qualifying for the
second-tier Supplemental Program. 2 6 Nonetheless, the narrower empha-
sis of the disaster program was reflected in references to the pre-existing
process by which states could request declaration of disaster areas and
associated federal relief.2 7
Eligibility for assistance under the 1979 program remained basically
the same as it had been in 1978. The new regulations did make proof of
income eligibility more stringent, however, where the aid sought was
cash for paying outstanding bills. 128 In those instances, documented proof
of income was mandatory. This requirement was one of a number of new
121. See supra text accompanying note 111. Perhaps even more telling is the fact
that only $15 million was allocated to the Regular Program. 1979 Regulations, supra note
106, § 1061.52-7(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482. This money, as well as the funds under other
parts of the overall 1979 program, was to be granted to local community action agencies
in accordance with state-developed allocation plans, using essentially the same approach
to this process as in the prior years.
122. 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-8, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
123. Id. §§ 1061.52-8(a)(1) to -8(a)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
124. Id. § 1061.52-5(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
125. Id. § 1061.52-9, 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483.
126. See id. § 1061.52-5(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4482.
127. Id. § 1061.52-9(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483.
128. Id. § 1061.52-10(b)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483.
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restrictions on CSA's policy regarding payment of outstanding bills. CSA
announced that to be eligible, "the applicant must have received a notice
to disconnect, or, in the case of non-regulated fuel, have less than one
week's supply of fuel on hand."129 This requirement appeared to violate
the statutory prohibition added to the basic legislation in 1978.130 For this
and other reasons, the 1979 program was subjected to litigation similar
to that raised against the 1978 effort.'
It should be noted that outstanding energy bills were not an absolute
prerequisite to assistance. Such events as broken heating equipment or
water pipes could warrant aid. Even beyond those cases, the regulations
acknowledged that if a family had "paid at great sacrifice a large energy
bill and as a result ha[d] insufficient money to buy needed food or other
necessities, then they would be eligible for assistance.' ' 32 This last pos-
sibility, however, raised the specter of administrative unworkabiity, in
that the verification requirements imposed on the local agency might be
so extensive as to delay timely distribution of assistance.1 33
In summary, the 1979 program followed the 1978 approach closely,
but attempted to apply a more sophisticated allocation system to the
varying levels of need that might occur in different areas during winter.
It also attempted to adopt a clearer stance on the different kinds of
assistance available, and in particular tried to specify the circumstances
in which outstanding bills would be paid. In making these changes, the
1979 program came closer than any of the previous efforts to recognizing
the continuing nature of the overall problem, yet it still was labeled a
program of "emergencies" and "crises." The 1979 approach also raised
the possibility that its greater complexity built in administrative delays
to such an extent that the program would be self-defeating by postponing
payment past the time of winter needs.
129. Id. § 1061.52-10(b)(3)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483; see also id. § 1061.52-3(c), 44
Fed. Reg. at 4481. As in 1978, see 43 Fed. Reg. 9476 (1978), money payments were limited
to voucher payments and direct payments to suppliers of fuel or other assistance. 1979
Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-3(e), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4481. The $250 limit on
assistance of all forms to a household remained. Id. § 1061.52-15(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4484.
130. See supra note 78.
131. See Simer v. Olivarez, No. 79-C-3960 (N.D. Ill., filed Sept. 24, 1979), discussed
in 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 712 (1980). Subsequently the parties to the case worked out a
Stipulation and Agreed Order to resolve the suit and allocate the funds unobligated at the
end of the 1979 program. Following the raising of questions about the settlement in the
press, Congress, and elsewhere, the District Court judge vacated the Order months later.
He indicated doubts about his authority to direct the expenditure of the funds in the absence
of clearer congressional authority and concluded that the parties had misled him in this
respect. This action was appealed, and the judge's final order rejecting the settlement was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on other grounds. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1981).
132. 1979 Regulations, supra note 106, § 1061.52-10(b)(3)(iii), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4484.
133. Verification was to be done in a variety of respects, e.g., regarding income
eligibility, id. § 1061.52-10(b)(2), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483, individual household fuel supplies,
id. § 1061.52-10(b)(3)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483, and availability of support from other support
service networks, id. § 1061.52-10(b)(3)(i), 44 Fed. Reg. at 4483.
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B. 1980
The program for fiscal year 1980 represents a critical transition.
Congress authorized the program only after it became clear, in the early
autumn of 1979, that the key elements of a permanent program could not
be worked out in Congress in time for the coming winter.'34 The program
was declared to be an interim approach, and perhaps this explains, or
partially excuses, its unusually great complexity. It was proposed that a
permanent program would follow, based upon a link between energy
assistance for the poor and new taxes to be levied upon the windfall
profits of American oil companies. 35
The 1980 effort contained many new features which distinguished it
from the 1973-79 developments. These features also foreshadowed a new
orientation toward energy assistance for the poor, an incipient recognition
of the continuing nature of the problem and of the need for large financial
resources.
1. The Carter Initiative
President Carter's April 5, 1979 Energy Address to the Nation marks
the starting point for the 1980 program. 36 The President announced his
decision to begin a program for phasing out price controls on all do-
mestically produced crude oil by September 30, 1981.137 The stated goals
of decontrol were to increase domestic oil production, discourage energy
waste, and promote national energy independence. Recognizing that de-
control would be likely to increase significantly the profits of oil com-
panies, and to burden low income energy consumers severely, the Pres-
ident proposed a windfall profits tax and declared "part of the proceeds
... will go to help those ... who will be hurt most by rising energy
prices."'1 38 That effort, along with several others, was to be financed
134. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
136. 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 609 (Apr. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Carter
Energy Address]; see also U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN II (May
1979).
137. Carter Energy Address, supra note 136, at 610. Although this gradual decontrol
decision is usually attributed to presidential power alone, in fact the President was acting
pursuant to a statutory grant of authority. In 1975 Congress passed the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, which terminated all such oil price controls by September 30, 1981. Pub.
L. No. 94-163, § 461, 89 Stat. 871, 897. The Act allowed the President the discretion to
terminate the controls earlier, in whole or in part, beginning June 1, 1979. This discretionary
power was exercised in the April 1979 Address.
138. Carter Energy Address, supra note 136, at 612. He also pledged to "channel the
tens of millions of dollars we are already winning in lawsuits against oil companies for price
gouging into further energy assistance for lower-income citizens." Id.
In succeeding years some of the funds recovered by the government from oil com-
panies that were found to have violated the pre-existing price control regulations have been
directed to low income energy assistance. Most recently Congress included energy assis-
tance as one of five "energy conservation programs" for which oil overcharge funds could
be used. Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to disburse these "petroleum violation
[Vol. 7:371
HeinOnline  -- 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.  390 1983
Energy for the Poor
through a new Energy Security Fund from the windfall profits tax reve-
nues.13 9 Responding to an OPEC oil price hike of about forty percent in
June 1979, the President increased the amount of aid requested from $800
million to $1.6 billion annually. 140
That September the President revised his proposal, calling for Con-
gress to create a Low Income Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP) to
provide $1.6 billion in aid that winter and $2.4 billion annually there-
after. 41 The proposal had two components: an Energy Crisis Assistance
Program, which would provide $400 million to help states operate emer-
gency programs; and a Special Allowance Program, which would supply
energy assistance to needy households. 42 The latter program was in-
tended to reach all households with income below 125% of the federal
poverty threshold. 143
As late as September 27, 1979, the Carter Administration was telling
Congress that the President's support for the Low Income Energy As-
sistance Program was contingent on enactment of a windfall profits tax.144
Congress was still embroiled, however, in major disagreements on the
windfall profits tax legislation. In October the Administration acquiesced
to this reality and removed its stipulation. Congress then "rushed to meet
the winter's deadline.' 1 45 By this time the Carter Administration was
receiving intense pressure from many of its political allies, particularly
those in the Northeast, to do something quickly about the effects of the
escrow funds" among the states; each governor was then to apply the funds received to
low income energy assistance or one of the other energy conservation programs. Pub. L.
No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1891 (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 980, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-87
(1982). Early in 1981 a departing Carter Administration official caused considerable contro-
versy by giving $4 million of overcharge funds to charities for low income energy assistance
on the last day of the Carter Administration. See [9 Curr. Rep.] ENERGY USERS REPORT
355 (Feb. 26, 1981).
139. Carter Energy Address, supra note 136, at 612.
140. 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1241, 1244 (July 16, 1979) (remarks on energy
crisis and windfall profits tax); see also Memorandum from S. Eizenstat to Pres. Carter I
(July 11, 1979) (on file with author).
141. See President Carter's Proposal for Low-Income Energy Assistance, 15 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1639, 1639-1640 (Sept. 12, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Carter Proposal].
These amounts did not seem consistent with the President's statement regarding the "major
purpose" of the Fund, because most of its revenues were planned for uses other than low
income assistance. See Hill, Energy Problems Facing the Poor, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
219, 221 (July 1982).
142. Carter Proposal, supra note 141, at 1639-40. See URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH &
ENGINEERING, INC., THE 1980 Low INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: A REVIEW
AND ASSESSMENT 18 (report prepared for Office of Evaluation and Technical Analysis,
U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs., Aug. 1981) [hereinafter cited as URBAN SYSTEMS
REPORT].
143. Carter Proposal, supra note 141, at 1640; see infra notes 164-65.
144. Testimony of Patricia Harris, Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance, House Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (Sept. 27, 1979).
145. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 19.
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near doubling in heating oil prices that had occurred in some areas
between 1978 and 1979.146
Even before enactment of the main elements of the 1980 program,
CSA had received funds for continued activities under its existing au-
thority. The Administration had requested $250 million for the CSA
program, which was to be called the Energy Crisis Assistance Program
(ECAP) in 1980.147 A Conference Committee had approved this request
on July 31, 1979,148 and CSA had then issued ECAP regulations. 49 On
October 12 a Continuing Resolution provided the $250 million for CSA's
1980 program. 150
2. The 1980 Appropriations Act
The program took shape with the enactment of the 1980 Appropri-
ations Act on November 27, 1979.151 The Act provided $1.35 billion for
low income energy assistance, $150 million of which was to be added to
ECAP.152 Adding the prior $250 million for ECAP to the new funds meant
that energy assistance for fiscal 1980 would reach a level of $1.6 billion,
roughly an eight-fold increase over the two immediately preceding years.
In addition to the $400 million allocated to ECAP, $1.2 billion was
to go to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)153 for
distribution in accordance with a formula that represented a legislative
compromise on a number of major points. $400 million was to be paid
"as a special one-time energy allowance to recipients of Supplemental
Security Income" (SSI).' 54 States were to receive the remaining $800
146. Id. at 18. See also Memorandum from C. Edley, Jr. to Secretary P.R. Harris
(Oct. 1, 1979) (discussing the timing for "decoupling Low Income Energy Assistance and
the windfall profits tax") (on file with author); Memorandum from J. Watson to President
Carter (Sept. 8, 1979) ("No governor or other political leader in the Northeast with whom
I talk these days ever fails to mention the price problem ... it is virtually impossible to
overstate the political importance and implications of the issue for us.") (on file with author).
147. Testimony of Patricia Harris, supra note 144, at 3; Testimony of Patricia Harris,
Secretary of Health, Education, & Welfare, before the Subcomm. on Labor-HEW of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (Oct. 18, 1979).
148. H.R. REP. No. 400, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
149. 44 Fed. Reg. 51,780 (1979). These regulations, and their subsequent development
into the broader 1980 program, will be analyzed below. See infra text accompanying notes
173-206.
150. See Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, Current Federal and State Funding Authorities Which Can Be
Used for Energy Assistance and Weatherization 1 (Oct. 30, 1979); see also 125 CONG. REC.
H10,470 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1979). The Administration also sought a supplemental $150
million for the CSA effort, as part of its "interim plan." See URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT,
supra note 142, at 18.
151. 1980 Appropriations for the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies,
Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 978 (1980). See 15 WEEKLY COMP. PREs, Doc. 2154,
2154-57 (1979) (remarks on Pub. L. No. 96-126).
152. 1980 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. at 978.
153. Id. HEW was to make payments for "energy grants and allowances and related
administrative costs." Id.
154. Id. The SSI program is the federal cash transfer program for the aged, blind,
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million for distribution according to State Funding Plans that would
provide "assistance for those who pay fuel bills indirectly as well as
directly."l' 55 The formula for allocating these block grants among the
states was based upon only the first two elements of the formula for the
SSI-based funds. 56 It thus excluded consideration of the number of SSI
recipients in a given state and had the effect, even more so than the
three-part SSI formula, of strongly favoring the colder Northern states.157
This effect did not go unnoticed in Congress, and Western and Southern
members opposed both versions of the formula.158
It is striking that, after all the years of congressional appropriations
for the CSA energy crisis intervention programs, members of Congress
did not become involved in the details of spending these funds until the
1980 program. The increased need for energy assistance, the increased
political visibility of the issue, and the tremendous increase in funding
all help to explain this sudden attention. Unfortunately, once Congress
began to legislate on the specifics of energy assistance, it did so by
creating complex allocation formulae supported by no discernible
rationale.
and disabled. LEVITAN, supra note 4, at 35-38. This money was to be allocated among the
states according to a formula giving equal weight to the following three factors:
(1) the number of heating degree days squared, times the number of households below
125% of the poverty level;
(2) the difference in home heating expenditures between 1978 and 1979; and
(3) the number of SSI recipients in each state relative to the national total.
1980 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. at 978.
Applying each of these three factors to each state, and the resulting ranking of the
states, indicated how the $400 million for SSI recipients would be divided among the states.
See CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 47. The statute provided that no SSI recipient was to
receive more than $250 from these funds. Assuming that the allocation formula might award
a state more than $250 times the number of its SSI recipients, the legislation indicated that
any such excess was still to go to the state for distribution to recipients of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children or in accordance with other state distribution plans for energy
assistance funds. See H.R. REP. No. 604, infra note 187, at 38.
155. Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. at 979. Actually only $792.6 million was to be
allocated, apparently because the balance was to be allowed for federal administrative
costs. See 44 Fed. Reg. 69,032 (1979).
156. 1980 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. at 979.
157. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 21; see also A. Meadows, White
House Memorandum for E. Helminski on Low-Income Energy Assistance & the South,
(Sept. 26, 1979) ("Basing allocations to states on heating degree days and low-income
consumption of fuel oil instead of on energy costs harms states such as Florida that are
heavily dependent on fuel oil, which is burned to produce electricity, but that do not have
many heating degree days.").
158. Senator Bentsen of Texas, for example, vigorously objected to the formulae,
referring to them as "two proxies for need" which "do not correlate with need." 125 CoNc.
REc. S16,429 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1979). He also asserted that "the numbers for making such
a distribution are simply not available .... IT]he fact remains that we are pretending to
allocate money on a need basis, when we simply do not have the data to back that claim
up." Id. The absence of reliable data regarding relative home heating energy expenditures
among states was acknowledged by Patricia Harris, Secretary of HEW. See letter from
Patricia Harris to Sen. Byrd (Nov. 1, 1979).
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The 1980 Appropriations Act did contain some more lucid declara-
tions on other details, such as the directive that "the States shall, in
awarding funds, give priority to those households experiencing significant
increases in heating fuel costs over the levels of the previous year."' 159 It
also specified that the states should determine "the extent to which
increases in rents are caused by increases in heating fuel costs and
consider such portions of increases in rents to be increases in heating
costs."' 16 Additionally, Congress directed that "proof of income eligibility
shall be required of all applicants"' 6' and that no awards would be made
after June 30, 1980.162 Finally, the Act called for the funds appropriated
to be reimbursed to the Treasury from any windfall profit taxes "imposed
by Federal law on producers of domestic crude oil. ''163
Although the $1.6 billion appropriation amount was what the Carter
Administration had requested for 1980, Congress's decision that the funds
would be distributed through ECAP, SSI, and block grants to states
departed from the original proposal. While that proposal had sought $400
million for ECAP, the remaining $1.2 billion had been intended for recip-
ients of SSI 164 and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 165
"individuals that Congress ha[d] already determined to be in need of help
from the government."' 6 The main justification for the SSI-AFDC em-
phasis was time: direct payments to recipients of those benefits could be
issued through existing administrative channels quickly enough to help
meet upcoming winter needs.167 The Carter Administration thus was
giving serious, advance attention both to the magnitude of the need for
assistance and to the requirement that effective aid be supplied promptly.
In suggesting that three-quarters of the requested funds be admin-
istered by existing public assistance programs, the Administration was
making a major conceptual shift in the emphasis of energy assistance for
the poor. "In contrast to earlier years' programs, in which all households
had to apply for aid and attempts were made to relate benefits to house-
holds' actual energy needs, the 1980 programs also provided automatic
159. 1980 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. at 978.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 979.
164. Carter Proposal, supra note 141, at 1640.
165. Testimony of Patricia Harris, supra note 144, at 1.
166. Id. AFDC is the "largest, costliest, and most controversial public assistance
program." LEViTAN, supra note 4, at 28. It is primarily funded by the federal government,
although its administration, including eligibility standards and benefit levels, is controlled
by the states. Id. at 29-30. AFDC "provides income assistance to needy families in which
the children have been deprived of support because at least one parent is deceased, disabled,
absent from the home, or (at State option) unemployed." S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 110 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 500, 519.
167. Carter Proposal, supra note 141, at 2. In contrast, "a large-scale block grant
program could not be properly implemented in time for the forthcoming winter." U"nAN
SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 19.
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payments to all recipients of certain types of public assistance, regardless
of their actual energy expenses."'16 Once again - as in the allocation
formulae - new perspectives were at work identifying persons most in
need of energy assistance.
The Carter proposal's emphasis on using existing public assistance
categories of recipients became a major source of contention. 169 Ulti-
mately a compromise was reached for the three different avenues of
distribution described above: the CSA program would continue for an-
other year at a higher funding level ($400 million), each SSI recipient
automatically would receive up to $250 in direct payments ($400 million),
and the states would receive block grants which they could use as they
wished, either for further funding of ECAP efforts, for direct payments
to public assistance recipients, or for other energy aid programs of their
own design (approximately $800 million).170 As a result, "roughly half of
all the 1980 energy assistance funds were distributed as automatic pay-
ments to public assistance recipients, and therefore served as cash assis-
tance supplements rather than as crisis assistance payments.1
171
Thus the 1980 program substantially embodied the notion that an
effective energy assistance policy could allow individuals to decide for
themselves which of their energy needs - or other needs for that matter
- to meet with the cash payments awarded. This approach stands in
contrast to more energy-focused, yet arguably paternalistic, approaches
such as vendor payments, which channel government aid directly to the
supplier of the poor individual's fuel or energy source. 172
3. CSA's ECAP Regulations
As noted above, CSA had begun to promulgate regulations to govern
ECAP even prior to the final funding of any 1980 efforts. It also devised
its own formulae for allocating among the states the $250 million appro-
priated initially and without specific congressional formulations for its
disbursement. 173 The July Conference Report did provide some guidance
168. CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 49.
169. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 19.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
171. CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 49.
172. CSA had followed the vendor payment approach in SCIP and EEAP, as dis-
cussed above. See supra text accompanying note 74. Vendor payments also had been
recommended strongly in the 1979 draft of the FOMAC Report, supra note 4. See Draft
FOMAC REPORT 31 (July 1979).
173. 44 Fed. Reg. 51,780 (1979). But see Memorandum from J.L. Palmer, Deputy
Asst. Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Dep't Health, Educ., & Welfare, to J. Sawhill,
Deputy Secretary-Designate, Dep't Energy (Oct. 3, 1979), indicating "CSA is under a
mandate from the Senate Appropriations Committee to utilize [some measure of the actual
increase in energy costs faced by the poor at the state level] for this winter's crisis program."
See also U.S. Dep't Health, Educ., & Welfare, Low-Income Energy Assistance Programs
for FY 1980 (Nov. 27, 1979), listing state-by-state allocations of the ECAP funds and
indicating that CSA's formula for the original $250 million differed from Congress's formula
for the supplemental $150 million as follows: CSA's formula allocated half of the funds
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for allocating the funds; 174 the conferees directed "that an allocation
formula be developed immediately based on past severity of weather,
relative increase in the cost of fuel, and the numbers of low-income
individuals residing within the state."1 75 These factors formed the ground-
work for CSA's formula.
The Conference Report also observed that the states ultimately re-
ceiving the CSA funds could use them "as either cash grants or emer-
gency assistance such as heaters, blankets, food, alternate shelter, and
the like.' 76 It permitted either direct payments to households or direct
vendor payments for fuel costs. The report limited eligibility to house-
holds at or below 125% of the federal poverty level and to persons eligible
for SSI, adding that "[h]ighest priority should be placed on serving the
low income elderly."' 77 As before, payments under this program were
not to be considered as income for purposes of determining eligibility for
public assistance and similar programs. 178
On the basis of this guidance, and Congress's expressed intent to
fund another year of CSA's emergency energy assistance program under
the old statutory authority, 179 CSA proposed its 1980 ECAP regulations
on September 4, 1979.180 On October 11, 1979, CSA amended some
aspects of these regulations, responding to comments that had been
submitted after the September 4 notice.' 81 Most significantly, CSA re-jected the many comments urging it to compel governors of recipient
states to use community action agencies as the local administering agen-
cies. 182 It did so even though the ECAP program was still based on the
Economic Opportunity Act authority, with its strong emphasis on the
local poverty agencies. 183 The Conference Report, however, had directed
that governors be "given the flexibility to designate specific local delivery
according to heating degree days multiplied by a state's low-income population and the
other half according to the 1978-79 change in overall home "energy" expenditures, while
Congress's formula allocated half based on heating degree days squared multiplied by the
number of households below 125% of the poverty level and the other half on the 1978-79
change in home "heating" expenditures.
174. H.R. REP. No. 400, supra note 148, at 27-28.
175. Id. at 28.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Headstart Act, supra note 24, § 5(c), 88 Stat. at 2294-95.
180. 44 Fed. Reg. 51,780 (1979) (proposed regulations later amended at 44 Fed. Reg.
58,876).
181. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.70-1 to -16 (1982), 44 Fed. Reg. 58,876 (1979).
182. CSA said, "[ift would not be consistent with congressional intent to compel
Governors to utilize a specific local administering network. CSA does anticipate that
Governors will utilize Community Action Agencies where they have demonstrated the
capability to effectively implement energy assistance programs. CSA wishes to remind
prospective grantees that they must provide for the participation of the poor." 44 Fed. Reg.
58,876 (preamble to regulations).
183. See supra text acompanying notes 17-23.
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systems."'184 CSA thus conformed to congressional preference to let the
states shape many of the details of energy assistance. 185
Following passage of the Appropriations Act, CSA again amended
its ECAP regulations. 186 This final set of amendments governed not only
the supplemental $150 million added to ECAP, but also the original $250
million and such portions of the $800 million in block grants to the states
as the various governors wished to have administered by CSA under
ECAP. CSA also explicitly acknowledged that Congress had directed it
to make certain changes in its regulations. 8 7
In some respects the amended regulations' 88 resembled those for
prior years, but they differed from previous regulations in acknowledging
the detailed attention Congress was finally giving to energy assistance.
The most strikiAg new characteristics were the de-emphasis on commu-
nity action agencies and the increased emphasis on the roles of the states
and their governors. 89 The governor of a state was given the flexibility
to choose local administering agencies from among such sources as com-
munity action agencies, aging offices, and welfare offices. 190 The governor
was explicitly not precluded, however, from using only the initial state
grantee.' 91 The regulations did require that any local agencies selected
have "experience in operating programs that serve the poor."'192
The increased emphasis on state authority under ECAP is best illus-
trated by the requirement that a governor request funds by submitting a
State Funding Plan to the appropriate CSA Regional Office. 193 Each such
plan was to include specified elements reflecting the various congressional
concerns already identified. 194 This use of state plans as the vehicle for
184. H.R. REP. No. 400, supra note 148, at 28.
185. CSA also tacitly may have recognized that the Community Action Agencies
were no longer as important in the war on poverty as they earlier had been.
186. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,645 (1979).
187. CSA referred to some of the program details spelled out in the 1980 Appropri-
ations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 978 (1980), such as the June 30, 1980 payments
termination date and the priority to be given to households experiencing heating fuel cost
increases. Additionally, CSA noted some of the directions provided in the Conference
Report on that Act, such as that CSA should amend its regulations "to provide equal
treatment of paid fuel bills and unpaid fuel bills," and "to allow the Governor of each State
to request the authority to increase [the] ceiling" that CSA could impose on payments to
an eligible household. H.R. REP. No. 604, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1979).
188. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70 (1982), 44 Fed. Reg. 58,876 (1979).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 180-85..
190. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-6, 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
191. Id. One commentator has argued that in fact CSA "evidenced a strong preference
for utilization of community action agencies by states for ECAP, the organizations serving
as grantees for most other CSA programs and subject to CSA regulatory control." Laramey,
The National Response to Energy-Related Needs of the Poor, 12 URB. LAW., 526, 530
(1980).
192. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-6, 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
193. Id. § 1061.70-4(c), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
194. Id. § 1061.70-16, 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,879. There was a very short timetable
allowed for the submission of plans. They were to be presented within 15 days of the
regulations' effective date, which originally was October 11, 1979. Failure to submit a plan
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energy assistance conformed to the primary intent of the program: "to
make funds available to states to enable Governors to respond to energy-
related crises affecting poor and near poor households, which are caused
by the high cost of energy and an anticipated severe winter." 95 In prior
years CSA's regulations had never clearly declared such a major role for
the states.
As in earlier years, the regulations continued to emphasize the one-
time nature of the program. 196 They complied with congressional guidance
by calling for extensive outreach efforts by local agencies, including
attempts to contact persons receiving unemployment compensation who
might be eligible. 197 The elderly received highest priority in the pro-
gram, 98 which also covered renters, including those who paid for fuel
indirectly as well as directly.199 CSA set a maximum limit of $400 per
household on assistance payments under ECAP, subject to the governor's
power to include in the State Funding Plan a higher maximum justified
on specific grounds such as climate and fuel costs. 2°0 Regardless of the
maximum established in a given state, the regulations repeatedly empha-
sized that other energy allowances - such as those provided to SSI or
AFDC recipients - were not to be considered as income for purposes
of determining ECAP eligibility.201 The regulations also declared, how-
ever, that the "[t]otal amount of the energy allowances and/or assistance
under this program shall not exceed the amount needed to ameliorate the
household energy-problem [sic] or the maximum level of assistance in
the state, whichever is lower."202 CSA thus attempted to ensure that all
payments to a household under the various 1980 programs correlated
with need, and to honor the November Conference Report directive "that
there be no duplication of payments from any funds contained in this
program. 203
The focus of ECAP on "household energy" was clearly delineated
in the uses of funds allowed by the regulations. 2°4 The regulations also
allowed CSA to develop a plan for the state. Id. §§ 1061.70-11(b), -1l(d), 44 Fed. Reg. at
58,879. One commentator argued that the short time period for state plan submission
effectively would emasculate the states' power by necessarily subjecting them to CSA's
preferences. Laramey, supra note 191, at 529-30.
195. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-3(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
196. Id. § 1061.70-3(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
197. See H.R. REP. No. 400, supra note 148, at 27-28; 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-7(a)(1)(ii),
44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
198. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-7(a)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,877.
199. Id.
200. Id. § 1061.70-7(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,878.
201. Id. § 1061.70-9(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,878.
202. Id. § 1061.70-7(b), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,878.
203. H.R. REP. No. 604, supra note 187, at 38.
204. Allowable uses of funds included payments directly to "vendors and suppliers
of fuel, goods, and other services," "establishment of lines of credits [sic] with fuel/utility
vendors for the benefit of eligible households," "[d]irect money assistance not to exceed
$50... in those cases where a household is without resources to pay for other necessities
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explicitly excluded the use of ECAP funds for weatherization projects. 20 5
Apparently CSA had decided to keep its efforts and those of the De-
partment of Energy quite separate. 206
4. HEW's Block Grant Regulations
On November 30, 1979 HEW issued its regulations for the almost
$800 million that was to be distributed among the states as block grants. 20 7
The regulations were not particularly informative, since they were in-
tended to combine two different approaches to energy assistance, neither
of which required much explanation by the federal government. The first
approach consisted of automatic payments to persons already identified
as needy by virtue of their participation in an income maintenance pro-
gram such as AFDC. 2 s The second approach awarded block grants to
the states, and left it to them to fill in most of the substantive details. 209
HEW gave the states until December 27, 1979 to submit plans that
would govern the block grant funds. States could choose from among
four options under what HEW called its Energy Allowance Program
(EAP).210 Plan A consisted of a flat payment, no later than February 1980,
as a result of paying utility/fuel bills," and the provision of emergency goods or services in
kind to prevent "hardship or danger to health." 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-8, 44 Fed. Reg. at
58,878. In line with the congressional suggestion, the regulations provided that if an eligible
household had already paid its fuel bills, and thus did not need payments to vendors, it
should receive the other kinds of aid at levels equal to the bills already paid. Id. § 1061.70-
8(a), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,878; H.R. REP. No. 604, supra note 187, at 38. The same problem
was also addressed in the prohibition on requiring proof of unpaid fuel bills or notices of
termination of utility service as criteria for eligibility. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-9(b), 44 Fed.
Reg. at 58,878.
205. 45 C.F.R. § 1061.70-8(d), 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,878.
206. While CSA was at work on these regulations, it and other agencies were looking
ahead to appropriation of the larger amounts the Administration had requested. In partic-
ular, they were providing some early guidance to the states for preparation of the state
funding plans to be used under both ECAP and the expected HEW block grant programs.
The Conference Report on Pub. L. No. 96-126 recognized that this work could expedite
the distribution of the almost $800 million in block grant funds to the states. The conferees
thus directed "that HEW consider any plan that has been submitted by a State for energy
assistance to CSA and that has been approved be automatically considered as approved
for the purpose of that State's participation in the HEW block grant program." H.R. REP.
No. 604, supra note 187, at 38. In fact CSA had approved most state plans under ECAP
by December 1. See U.S. Dep't Health, Educ., & Welfare Fact Sheet, Energy Crisis
Assistance Program 2 (Nov. 27, 1979).
207. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,032 (1979).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. This short time period was prescribed by the Conference Report on the 1980
Appropriations Act. H.R. REP. No. 604, supra note 187, at 38. The idea was that, since
Congress was taking action so late in the autumn, no more than thirty days could be allowed
to the states. HEW was then given fifteen days in which to approve or disapprove the state
plans. It was feared that longer periods for developing and approving plans would mean
that the funds could not be distributed until winter was mostly over. HEW accepted the
conferees' recommendation that state plans approved by CSA under ECAP automatically
be approved for purposes of state participation in the HEW program. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,035
(1979).
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to all AFDC recipients. 211 The payment was to be unrestricted, with the
state determining a uniform, state-wide amount. 212 Plan A reflected the
Carter Administration's original insistence that energy assistance for the
winter of 1980 could only be provided in time if it were linked to the SSI
and AFDC administrative machinery.213 Plan A appeared to give each
state an opportunity to accept that view. Instead of using that approach,
however, it could design its own scheme, subject to the various congres-
sional requirements. 214
Plan B offered an option similar to Plan A, except that it allowed a
state to choose an income-based program other than AFDC for identi-
fying eligible recipients, or to base eligibility on a combination of AFDC
and other programs, such as Food Stamps or General Assistance. Unlike
Plan A, benefit levels under Plan B could vary within a state according
to "demonstrable differences in circumstances of the assistance unit such
as family size or established differentials or changes in shelter or heating
costs (including those related to geography and climate). '215
Plan C allowed a state to transfer all or part of its EAP money to
the state agency administering the ECAP funds. 216 The combined funds
would then be administered within the state in accordance with the State
Funding Plan approved by CSA. 2 17 As noted above, 218 the ECAP regu-
lations were to apply also to new block grant funds that the states
administered under Plan C. Almost half of the block grant funds actually
were turned over to ECAP. 2 9 "Most of the remaining funds were sent
by the states in automatic payments to AFDC, food stamps, or other
public assistance recipients. '220
The final option, Plan D, allowed a state to develop its own plan,
employing distribution or payment mechanisms of its choice. 22' Eligibility
was still limited, however, to persons below 125% of poverty level,
although states again could extend eligibility to recipients of AFDC, Food
211. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,032 (1979).
212. Single-person assistance "units," however, were only to receive half of what
multi-person units were to get. Provisions were included to ensure that if SSI and AFDC
recipients shared a household, payments to the latter could be reduced so that the combined
total would not exceed the state's payment level for a multi-person AFDC household. Id.
at 69,035.
213. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
214. The requirements included: eligibility at 125% of poverty level or below; man-
datory proof of eligibility; a payment cutoff date of June 30, 1980; priority to households
with significant heating fuel cost increases; and inclusion of renters paying for fuel indirectly
or directly. 44 Fed. Reg. at 69,036.
215. Id. at 69,037.
216. Fifteen states put all their funds into Plan C, and 26 did so with part of their
grants. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 26.
217. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,037 (1979).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 186-187.
219. Hill, supra note 141, at 221.
220. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 26.
221. 44 Fed. Reg. 69,038.
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Stamps, or a statewide program of regularly paid General Assistance. 222
Twenty-one states chose Plan D; ten of these designed what were essen-
tially Plan B programs, under which funds were distributed automatically
to public assistance recipients. The remaining eleven states developed a
variety of approaches. 223
Through these options, HEW offered the states the opportunity to
make quick decisions, employing as little or as much additional planning
as they desired. As one study observed,
[t]he states, [HEW], and CSA were very successful in getting state ...
plans submitted, approved, and operational on schedule. The timetable was
met by the vast majority of states. By April of 1980, well over half of the
$800 million allocated to states had been passed on to low-income house-
holds, with many of the payments issued in January and February.224
5. HEW's SSI Payments Regulations
On December 21, 1979, HEW issued its regulations for administering
the $400 million that the 1980 Appropriations Act directed to be paid to
SSI recipients. 225 As with the HEW block grant regulations, these added
little of substance to the 1980 energy assistance program. The regulations
reiterated two statutory provisions: the three-part allocation formula, 226
and the provision that if the $250 limit left a state with excess funds,
those funds would be added to the amounts granted to the state under
the block grant EAP program. 227
The regulations clarified the automatic eligibility of SSI recipients,
including eligible spouses. Eligibility was to be determined as of Decem-
ber, 1979, and no separate application for the energy allowance was
necessary. 228 Eligible persons would receive a one-time federal energy
allowance check in the mail early in 1980. The amounts, as listed in the
Federal Register notice, would vary by state.229
222. Id.
223. URBAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142, at 26.
224. Id. at 24.
225. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,727 (1979).
226. Id. at 75,728; see supra text accompanying notes 116-27. The regulations ex-
plained that "the amount paid an SSI recipient will vary from State to State because it is
determined by the amount allocated to the State divided by the estimated SSI recipient
population in the State." 44 Fed. Reg. at 75,727.
227. 44 Fed. Reg. at 75,727.
228. Id.
229. Recipients in Hawaii would get $34 and those in Florida $39. The maximum
amount, $250, was to be received in 11 states. The disbursement of these payments
reportedly went smoothly. Hill, supra note 141, at 221 n.13. The only aspect of the program
which received adverse publicity was "the fact that some recipients (a small percentage)
lived in publicly funded homes, where they were effectively protected against the rising
costs of home heating energy." Id. Although this problem had been anticipated, and could
not be avoided because of the shortness of time, operators of some care facilities "put
pressure on SSI recipients to turn checks over to the homes and many recipients were
unsure of their rights." Id.
19831
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6. The 1980 Program in Perspective
The 1980 program introduced several new perspectives on the size,
purposes, and implementation of energy assistance for the poor. The
Carter Administration attempted to link this aid to new tax revenues from
domestic oil producers. The numerous programs developed by the states
served almost as "experiment[s] with various approaches in preparation
for the larger, FY 1981 program." 230) Nonetheless, the latitude afforded
to the states, and the three-part compromise embodied in the 1980 Ap-
propriations Act, indicate a continuing lack of clear congressional per-
spective on the energy cost problems facing the poor. One result was
that the treatment of recipients in various states often differed without
any clear justification. 231 Although Congress was finally becoming ac-
tively involved in low income energy assistance, no clear direction for
the effort had yet emerged.
C. The 1981 Low Income Energy Assistance Program
1. The Home Energy Assistance Act of 1980
Early in 1980 a windfall profits tax finally was enacted. 23 2 In line with
President Carter's original proposal, the legislation included provisions
aimed at directing some of the new tax revenues to energy assistance for
the poor.23 3 In this respect the new program appeared to achieve the
basic objective of linking energy assistance with oil company profits.
Although the President had also urged that the program be made per-
manent, however, this was not done.
In the months following the Carter initiative in 1979, numerous en-
ergy assistance bills had been presented in Congress. 234 The major pro-
visions of one such bill235 were eventually enacted as Title III of the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act,236 which became law on April 2, 1980.
Although Title III was officially named the Home Energy Assistance Act
of 1980, 2 37 it was more often referred to as LIEAP, for the Low-Income
Energy Assistance Program that it established. The legislation has been
described as "a modified block grant approach to energy assistance. '238
230. Id. at 221.
231. Id.
232. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
233. See infra text accompanying notes 246-49.
234. See FOMAC REPORT, supra note 4, at Appendix A (list of bills). See also S.
REP. No. 378, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1979).
235. See S. REP. No. 378, supra note 234, at 38; 125 CONG. REc. S16,838 (daily ed.
Nov. 16, 1979).
236. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980). There is no indication that Congress
ever took any action to effectuate the expressed intention in the 1980 Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 978, 979 (1979) that windfall profit tax revenues would be used
to reimburse the Treasury for the $1.6 billion 1980 energy assistance program.
237. Pub. L. No. 96-223, Title 11I, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LIEAP],
repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2611, 95 Stat. 902 (1981).
238. Hill, supra note 141, at 222.
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The Act authorized $3.115 billion in federal funds, $100 million of which
was to be transferred to CSA for energy crisis programs under its Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act authority.239 Ninety-five percent of the total au-
thorization was to be allocated among the states for distribution in ac-
cordance with plans that they were to submit to the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare. 24° The Secretary was to approve or disapprove
state plans in the light of criteria detailed in the statute, as well as on the
basis of implementing regulations that the Secretary was required to issue
within 60 days after enactment.24'
With regard to the proposed link between energy assistance and the
windfall profits tax, the original House version of the tax would have
created an Energy Trust Fund into which all revenues from the tax were
to be deposited.242 This version, however, would have left to future
legislation the specifics of how the revenues would be spent.243 The
Senate version would have established a Taxpayer Trust Fund to receive
revenues from the tax.244 Although the Senate bill called for more energy
assistance funding than the annual $2.4 billion sought by President Carter,
it also provided for lower revenues from the windfall profits tax than
either the President or the House proposed.245
The compromise ultimately enacted established an account at the
Treasury Department to keep track of the revenues from the tax and
their disposition.246 The Conference Committee recommended the follow-
ing formula for allocation of the revenue: twenty-five percent of net
revenue was to be for low income energy assistance, sixty percent for
reduction of income taxes, and fifteen for energy and transportation
programs. 247 Net revenues in excess of the projected revenues would be
239. LIEAP, supra note 237, §§ 304(b), 306(a)(3)(C), 306(a)(4), 306(b)(1)(B), 94 Stat.
at 289, 290, 292. CSA's 1981 activity under this funding was the Energy Crisis Intervention
Program (ECIP), "designed to complement H.H.S.'s Low Income Energy Assistance Pro-
gram." A description of ECIP may be found at U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
Low INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR
1981, at 44-47 (1982) [hereinafter cited as HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS].
240. LIEAP, supra note 237, §§ 306(a)(1), 308, 94 Stat. at 289, 294. HEW soon
thereafter became the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
241. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 313(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 299. Interim Final Regulations
were issued May 30, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 36,810; final regulations were issued Oct. 7, 1980,
45 Fed. Reg. 66,666 (originally codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 260) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Regulations].
242. See H.R. REP. No. 817, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1980) (conference report),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 670.
243. Id.
244. Id. Appropriations were proposed at the following levels: $3.025 billion for fiscal
year 1981, $4.025 billion each for fiscal years 1982 and 1983. See id. at 153, 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 704.
245. See Petrini, The Broken Promise: Low Income Energy Assistance and the Crude
Oil Windfall Profits Tax, 7-8 (Apr. 7, 1982) (paper prepared for National Consumer Law
Center).
246. H.R. REP. No. 817, supra note 242, at 117, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 670.
247. Id.
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allocated one-third for low income energy assistance and two-thirds for
income tax reductions. 248 Section 102 of the Act included these percent-
ages, but declared they were to be only "for accounting purposes." 249
The legislative history clearly indicates that the allocation formula
was not a binding commitment of Congress. In debate over the confer-
ence bill, Senator Long, one of its chief supporters, explained that the
formula was simply an expression of where Congress thought the money
should go and was not binding on either the Appropriations Committees
or the Budget CommitteesY 0 This resistance to enacting a binding allo-
cation formula seemed to be based on a concern over maintaining bud-
getary control. Senator Bellmon expressed this strongly during the de-
bate, asserting that "earmarking" the funds would increase the number
of expenditures not controlled through the budget process. 251
Even though the allocation formula was not binding, many observers
initially expected that the actual appropriations would reflect the twenty-
five percent figure. This was based on the comments of some members
of Congress that the allocation preference was a non-binding "commit-
ment," clearly indicating the prevailing attitude of Congress. 252 This hope
was short-lived. Although LIEAP was authorized to be funded at $3.115
billion,253 in the fall of 1980 Congress passed Continuing Resolutions
making available only $1.85 billion for fiscal year 1981 .2 4
A number of features of the Act distinguished it from all the previous
congressional actions on energy assistance. First, Congress included a
set of eight findings at the outset of the Act. These findings acknowledged
that "the cost of essential home energy imposes a disproportionately
larger burden" on some Americans than on others. 2 5 Instead of limiting
this finding to the poor, however, Congress said the burden fell on "fixed-
248. Id.
249. Id.
250.
Mr. President, let me just speak to the earmarking in the conference report. That is simply a
statement that the Treasury will keep a record of how much is collected and will attempt to
keep some record of where the money goes. We say in the law that we think 25 percent ought
to go to lower income households, 60 percent for income tax reductions, and 15 percent for
energy and transportation programs. But that is not binding.
Those Appropriations Committees can recommend appropriations the way they want to
do it. The taxwriting committees can either recommend or not recommend tax cuts. And the
Budget Committee can recommend whatever it pleases about any of this.
So that while that is stated as a statement of desire, it is not binding. The Senator can use
it all to balance the budget, if he wants to, provided the Senate will support him on that.
126 CONG. REc. S3042 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980) (statement of Sen. Long).
251. 126 CONG. REC. S2853 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1980).
252. 126 CONG. REC. S3124 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Domenici).
253. See supra text accompanying note 239.
254. Pub. L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351, 1354 (1980); Pub. L. No. 96-536, 94 Stat.
3166, 3168 (1980). See also Petrini, supra note 245, at 10 ("If Congress had appropriated
an amount equal to the 25% figure, the program would have received a total of $3.48 billion,
nearly twice the $1.85 billion appropriated.").
255. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 302(a)(3), 94 Stat. at 288.
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income, lower income, and lower middle income households. ' '256 Con-
gress also found not just that "adequate home heating is a necessary
aspect of shelter," but also that "adequate home cooling is necessary for
certain individuals to avoid a threat to life, health, or safety."'257
As in the 1980 legislation, Congress included a basic formula for
allocating funds among the states.35s Several other provisions, however,
could increase or decrease the amount that a state actually received 59
For example, HEW could reduce a state's allotted funds if it determined
that the amount allocated to the state under the formula was more than
the state actually needed to carry out its particular plan.260 The Secretary
256. Id.
257. Id. § 302(a)(5)-(6), 94 Stat. at 288. The Act broadened the types of energy needs
that might be funded to include not only heating costs but also cooling costs where excessive
heat was a threat to life and health. LIEAP, supra note 187, §§ 302(a)(6), 303(2), 94 Stat.
at 288, 288. Congress was somewhat reluctant to include cooling costs; a motion to strike
the cooling provisions was defeated in the Labor and Human Resources Committee by one
vote. S. REP. No. 378, supra note 234, at 38. The senators who offered the motion feared
that the cooling provision might divert funds from the "major purpose" of the program -
to provide life-saving heating assistance. From their viewpoint the need for cooling assis-
tance had not been sufficiently established and there were no clear criteria to assure that
funds needed to keep people alive in cold weather would not be diverted to keeping people
"comfortable" in hot weather. Id. at 86.
This hesitancy was reflected in the allocation formula's emphasis on heating needs
and the restrictions on the use of funds for subsidizing cooling costs. One of the main
factors in the allocation formula was the number of heating degree days per year in the
state, i.e., a measurement of the number of cold days requiring heating. LIEAP, supra
note 237, § 306(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 290. See also CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 52. Cooling
needs received no such special recognition.
Even if a state elected to have a cooling plan, funds would be granted only to
households that could show that cooling was a medical necessity. LIEAP, supra note 237,
§ 308(c), 94 Stat. at 297. Cooling was seen as such only if there was a threat to life or
health due to a particular illness or medical condition which could be ameliorated by cooling
facilities. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.156(b), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694. A dis-
cussion of the severity of health effects of heat waves may be found in Jones, et al.,
Morbidity and Mortality Associated With the July 1980 Heat Wave in St. Louis and Kansas
City, Mo., 247 J. A.M.A. 3327, 3331 (1982) ("Unless a coordinated community effort is
mounted during the next major heat wave, the remarkable loss of life in 1980 and previous
major heat waves will be repeated.").
258. This formula directed that half of the funds would be allocated according to a
state's "aggregate residential energy expenditure" as compared with that of other states,
and the other half according to the each state's total number of heating degree days for a
state squared, and multiplied by the "number of households in such State having incomes
equal to or less than the lower living standard income level." LIEAP, supra note 237,
§ 306(a)(l)-(2), 94 Stat. at 289-90.
Congress based this formula on several assumptions: "1) low and lower middle income
households are in need of energy assistance; 2) the assistance should be designed to offset
a portion of the rising costs of home energy, and 3) the problem is most critical in areas
with high heating costs." S. REP. No. 378, supra note 234, at 12.
259. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 306(a)(3)-(4), 94 Stat. at 290, provided for the allo-
cation of additional funds to a state to ensure that it received an amount necessary to
provide at least $120 to each SSI, AFDC, and Food Stamp household. Some states would
be subject to pro rata reductions in funds in order to permit that minimum amount to be
allocated to other states. See H.R. REP. No. 817, supra note 242, at 153.
260. In addition, the statute directed the Secretary to take into account climatic
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also was to take into account the state's option to reserve up to three
percent of its allocated funds for weather related and supply shortage
emergencies. 261 If the state chose to set aside this reserve, it was to treat
the reserve separately in order to avoid reallocating the funds prema-
turely.262 Congress apparently intended these allocation provisions to
insure that funds would not lie unused in one state when there was need
for them in another state.263
2. The State Plans
States had to submit their plans within thirty days after publication
of final regulations. 264 By January 1, 1981, forty-five state plans had been
submitted and approved. 265 In order to obtain approval, state plans had
to meet the requirements of the statute and regulations, which set forth
a large number of detailed factors to be addressed by the states.266
First, section 305 set out criteria for identifying eligible households,
starting with those in which there were recipients of AFDC, SSI, Food
Stamps, or certain veterans pensions. 267 Eligibility also extended to other
households with incomes below the "lower living standard income
level.''268 This shift from the "poverty level" baseline of the 1980 legis-
conditions in determining a state's needs. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 306(c), 94 Stat. at 290.
States were not to be penalized for spreading out funds over the course of the winter, or
the summer where cooling programs were part of the state plan. See S. REP. No. 378,
supra note 234, at 14; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.108(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at
66,689.
261. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(14), 94 Stat. at 296.
262. See S. REP. No. 378, supra note 234, at 19.
263. Id. at 14. In addition to the funds allocated by these provisions, a state might
also be eligible for "incentive grants." LIEAP, supra note 237, § 306(b)(3)(A), 94 Stat. at
292. The Act authorized a portioh of the funds to be allocated to states which provide fuel
assistance with state funds. Federal grants could match up to 25% of the state program.
The purpose of the federal grants would be to encourage states which already had fuel
assistance programs to continue them, and to provide an incentive to states without such
programs to begin them. Id.
264. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.24(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,688.
265. HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 239, at 3.
266. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, §§ 260.26, 260.28, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,688-89.
HHS could waive plan requirements if requested to do so by a state; waivers were to be
granted where HHS determined that it was necessary for the state administration of the
program and likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the program. LIEAP, supra
note 237, § 308(d)(2), 94 Stat. at 297; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.26(a), 45 Fed.
Reg. at 66,688.
267. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 305(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 289.
268. Id. §§ 303(3), 305(a)(2), 94 Stat. at 288, 289; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241,
§ 260.150, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694. The "lower living standard level" was determined by the
Secretary of Labor based upon the most recent "lower living standard family budget"
issued by the Secretary. That standard:
takes more of a family's normal living expenses into account, and it is adjusted by geographic
area. While applying the poverty index suggests that there have been between 24 and 25 million
"poor" Americans at any given time in recent years, the LLS standard yields a larger number
- about 45 million persons in some 13 or 14 million households. To be specific, in the fall of
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lation to the "lower living standard" broadened the category of eligible
recipients. Congress was taking a wider view of the segment of the
American public deserving help in meeting energy needs. The statute
also continued the 1980 policy of extending eligibility to renters and
required that state plans assure that owners and renters would be treated
"equitably." 269
This expanded number of potential recipients was balanced by the
flexibility given the states in applying the eligibility standards. States did
not have to provide benefits for every household defined as eligible, 270
and thirty-two states chose to apply more restrictive income eligibility
standards. 271 The statute required, however, that a state using this option
make sure that households with the lowest incomes were not excluded
from the state's plan.272
States also had to guarantee that eligible households with the lowest
incomes and those with elderly or handicapped persons would be given
priority for assistance. 273 This goal could be met by special application
procedures, timing of benefits, or guarantees of assistance if program
funds were inadequate.274 Furthermore, to insure that receipt of energy
assistance under this plan would not jeopardize a household's eligibility
for other assistance programs or tax benefits, the Act prohibited counting
energy assistance payments as income.275
1980 the national average income needed to provide the Lower Living Standard for a family of
four living in an urban metropolitan area was $14,044 - nearly 170 percent of the poverty index
for a household of that size.
H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, supra note 4, at 19.
269. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(10), 94 Stat. at 295. The Labor and Human
Resources Committee described equitable treatment as requiring the provision of "generally
comparable relief from energy cost burdens to both classes of recipients." S. REP. No.
378, supra note 234, at 18. When information on the actual energy costs of indirect
purchasers was not available, the state was to estimate the cost based on the energy
expenses of similarly situated direct energy purchasers. See CBO REPORT, supra note 28,
at 54.
270. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.152(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694; see also
U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Summary of LIEAP for 1981, at 2 (Apr. 18, 1980).
271. HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 239, at ii; see also CBO REPORT, supra
note 28, at 53. Thus it is not surprising that LIEAP assistance only reached an estimated
36% of the number of statutorily eligible households. HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 239, at ii.
272. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.152(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694.
273. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(6)(A), 94 Stat. at 294; 1981 Regulations, supra
note 241, § 260.155, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,695.
274. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(6)(A), 94 Stat. at 294; 1981 Regulations, supra
note 241, § 260.155, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,695.
275. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 313(c)(1), 94 Stat. at 299. This prohibition applied
whether the payments were made directly to the household or in the form of a vendor
payment. H.R. REP. No. 817, supra note 242, at 154. In addition, each state plan had to
ensure that the level of benefits in other federally assisted cash assistance programs would
not be reduced as a result of energy assistance. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(18), 94
Stat. at 296.
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The Act further specified that the states had to provide the highest
levels of assistance to households with the lowest incomes and the highest
energy costs in relation to income. 276 The regulations specified that states
could do so through higher benefit levels or through favorable methods
of income calculation for households with priority. 77 Benefits were to be
closely correlated with each household's energy burden. 278 This emphasis
on the particular situation of each household necessarily shifted the
program away from automatic payment amounts.
A state still could elect, however, to use automatic payments to
categories of eligible households such as those receiving SSI, AFDC,
Food Stamps, or veterans benefits.2 79 States could make such payments
without requiring a separate application, 280 but they had to establish
procedures to ensure that payments would not be made to households
not actually in need.281 Furthermore, if a state did choose this approach,
other payment mechanisms in its plan had to ensure that priority would
still be given to the lowest income households and that the levels of
assistance would vary according to the factors set out in the statute. 282
States could provide assistance through direct payments to the eli-
gible households, through payments to suppliers of the energy, or through
a combination of the two approaches. 283 Before assistance could be given
276. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(6)(B), 94 Stat. at 294-95.
277. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.154(b), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694-95.
Payment amounts were to vary according to differences of individual circumstances or of
categories of households. In computing the benefit amounts, states were to take into
account: (1) the average home energy expenditure for the households in the state; (2) the
proportional burden of energy costs in relation to income; (3) any regional variations, if
significant, in heating degree days; and (4) the extent to which households are vulnerable
to or are protected from the rising costs of energy through other government programs.
LIEAP, supra note 237, §§ 308(b)(6)(A)-(B), 94 Stat. at 294-95; 1981 Regulations, supra
note 241, § 260.154, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694-95.
278. See CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 53.
279. 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.154(f), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694-95.
280. Id.
281. Id. § 260.154(f)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694-95.
282. Id. § 260.154(f), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694-95. To ensure that individuals in need
of energy assistance but not already part of an existing government assistance program
would receive benefits, each state plan was to include outreach activities. LIEAP, supra
note 237, § 308(b)(16), 94 Stat. at 296. Special emphasis was to be placed on reaching the
elderly, the handicapped, those in remote areas, those unable to leave their residences,
migrants, individuals with limited English-speaking ability, the working poor, and families
with children. Id. The only specific funding for the outreach activities was $3 million out
of CSA's $100 million allotment. That funding was to be used to notify the elderly of the
assistance available under the Act. Id. § 306(b)(4)(A), 94 Stat. at 292.
283. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(3)(A), 94 Stat. at 294; 1981 Regulations, supra
note 241, § 260.152(b), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,694. In fact, most states did use a combination
of vendor and direct payments. See CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 54; HHS REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 239, at iii.
Where eligible households were living in certain types of federally assisted housing
projects, the states also could make benefit payments to the building operators, provided
such operators gave assurances that tenants eligible for assistance were not discriminated
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through energy suppliers, each state was to enter into agreements with
the suppliers to insure prompt and fair payment procedures .U 4 The sup-
plier also had to agree not to terminate energy supplies unless the house-
hold had both failed to pay its charged amount for at least two months
and had received a notice of termination no less than thirty days prior to
termination.28 5 The household also had to be afforded a pre-termination
hearing by an agency designated by the state.286
Another major requirement imposed by the statute was coordination
of LIEAP with other energy programs, including CSA's crisis interven-
tion program and the weatherization program. 28 7 This provision reflected
Congress's recognition that subsidizing home fuel costs is only one ap-
proach to alleviating the energy burden. States had to ensure that, to the
maximum extent possible, individuals would be referred to existing
weatherization and energy conservation programs. 2 8 This requirement
seems to have been an attempt to reconcile the tension between the
weatherization and subsidy approaches. Weatherization arguably con-
tributes to a long-term solution of the energy problem by increasing home
energy conservation, while subsidies may have the opposite effect. By
requiring coordination between the two programs, Congress seemed to
express a hope that they could complement each other.289
against with respect to their rent. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(3)(B), 94 Stat. at 294.
The regulations set out detailed instructions on which specific building operators were
covered by the statute, how the payments should be calculated, and the required admin-
istrative duties of the State in overseeing these payments. 1981 Regulations, supra note
241, §§ 260.200-260.208, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,696-97.
284. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(7), 94 Stat. at 296; 1981 Regulations, supra
note 241, § 260.250(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,697. The state had to pay the suppliers on a
"timely" basis through installments, as reimbursements, or as a line of credit, and had to
notify each participating household of the amounts being paid on its behalf. LIEAP, supra
note 237, § 308(b)(7)(A), 94 Stat. at 295; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, §§ 260.250(b)-
(c), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,697. The supplier was to charge the participating household through
its regular billing process any difference between the actual costs of the energy supplied
and the assistance payment made by the state. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(7)(B), 94
Stat. at 295; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.250(a)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,697. The
supplier was required not to discriminate against any eligible household in regard to terms
and conditions of sale, delivery, or price of the energy supplied. LIEAP, supra note 237,
§ 308(b)(7)(C), 94 Stat. at 295; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.250(a)(2), 45 Fed.
Reg. at 66,697.
285. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(b)(7)(D), 94 Stat. at 295; see also 1981 Regulations,
supra note 191, §§ 260.254-.260, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,698.
286. Id. To ensure that these provisions would not place an undue burden on the
ability of a small vendor to continue in business, states could exempt a small energy
supplier from the termination restrictions if compliance would seriously jeopardize the
ability of the vendor to continue in business. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 308(f), 94 Stat. at
297; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241, § 260.260(a), 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,698; see also S.
REP. No. 378, supra note 234, at 18.
287. LIEAP, supra note 237, § 313(e), 94 Stat. at 299.
288. Id. §§ 308(b)(15), 313(f), 94 Stat. at 299, 299; 1981 Regulations, supra note 241,
§ 260.58, 45 Fed. Reg. at 66,690.
289. See CBO REPORT, supra note 28, at 22.
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3. The 1981 Program in Perspective
The 1981 program appeared to be a culmination of the earlier, spo-
radic efforts to develop a comprehensive energy assistance program for
the poor. Congress enacted the program earlier in the year than the
previous efforts, although this was a result of the 1979 deadlock over the
windfall profits tax. Nonetheless, early enactment permitted more careful
advance planning by states and local agencies. That planning was done
under intensive federal supervision, in accordance with an unusually
comprehensive statutory mandate covering a myriad of program details.
LIEAP offered the states flexibility in mixing automatic payments
with application-based payments, recognizing that the latter make it more
likely that payments will correspond to need, but that the former are
more administratively manageable and probably cover a substantial seg-
ment of the needy households. Preventive aid was to be provided in a
more orderly fashion than ever before. Only three percent of a state's
funds were to be available for emergencies arising from weather condi-
tions and supply shortage, and even the $100 million directed to CSA
was primarily for outreach and other activities supporting the broad
LIEAP effort.290 Congress appropriated more funds than ever, even
though the statute's recommended share of the new tax revenues was
not approached. In short, Congress seemingly had overcome the earlier
emphasis on one-time emergency aid and had committed to large-scale
funding with broader income maintenance concerns in mind.
D. The 1982 Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program
1. The Block Grant Proposal
The arrival of the Reagan Administration in Washington introduced
some new elements into the legislative deliberations on energy assistance.
The Administration sought to reduce the funding available for many social
programs and to shift their administration from the federal government
to the states. 291 Both of these emphases had important impacts on the
1982 energy assistance effort.
The Administration proposed that low income energy assistance be
merged with other existing programs that provide households with emer-
gency financial aid or other forms of crisis support. 292 The result was to
be a combined "Energy and Emergency Assistance Block Grant," one
of many new block grants proposed. 293 The program would not require
state matching funds, and states would have "complete flexibility" in
290. See supra text accompanying note 261.
291. See generally Office of Management & Budget, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1983, at 5 (1982).
292. Office of Management & Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions: Additional
Details on Budget Savings 146 (Apr. 1, 1981) (Doe. No. 180.20).
293. Id.
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delivering fuel assistance and other emergency services.2 94 As one com-
mentator described it:
The Administration's aim was to give states the open-ended authority to
expend monies, without any required plan approval or thorough explanation
of intent, on a wide ranging list of possible emergency matters, of which
an energy crisis would only be one.295
Although the proposal offered the states great flexibility in using
federal funds, at the same time it would significantly cut that funding.
The Reagan Administration budget proposed to fund the combined energy
assistance and emergency assistance programs at $1.4 billion, approxi-
mately a twenty-five percent reduction from the 1981 level.296 The Ad-
ministration's primary concern, of course, was to reduce projected
budget deficits.2 97 The Administration's perspective on "the special case
of the poor" was stated as follows:
This problem must not be overlooked, but it is a broad social problem that
does not relate exclusively to energy and should not prevent a national
energy and economic recovery program that is designed to help all Amer-
icans and restore a sound economy that is most helpful to the poor.
The special burdens placed on the poor by higher energy prices are
best addressed by agencies most sensitive to people's overall income and
housing needs. In view of great price variations by region and by fuel form,
the means of relief may best be gauged by agencies close to those in need.298
The Administration's emphasis on broad budgetary concerns largely
shifted the legislative initiative with regard to energy assistance to the
congressional budget committees. On August 13, 1981, following turbu-
lent legislative battles, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act, Title XXVI of which was the Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Act of 1981.299 The legislation as enacted differed significantly
from the proposed $1.4 billion, consolidated block grant. It made energy
assistance an entirely separate block grant program and authorized annual
funding of $1.875 billion.30
294. Id.
295. Hill, supra note 141, at 224.
296. See Petrini, supra note 245, at 12 n.34; STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 4, at 52.
297. See STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 4, at
52.
298. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SECURING AMERICA'S ENERGY FUTURE: THE NA-
TIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN 12 (1981).
299. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8621-8629 (West
Supp. 1982). Activities under this Act are referred to as LIEAP, as in 1981, or as the Low
Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). See H.R. REP. No. 208, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1006 (conference report), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1010,
1368.
300. Id.
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In many respects the Act continued substantive features previously
embodied in the now-repealed 1981 legislation. 301 The most important
new feature was a greatly altered relationship between federal and state
authorities in developing and executing the program.302 Furthermore, for
the first time, Congress authorized multi-year funding, something that
President Carter had urged in his 1979 proposals. 30 3 The 1982 effort was
to be the first year of a three year authorization of $1.875 billion
annually.304
2. The Low Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981
In contrast to the 1981 legislation, the statute for 1982-84 no longer
requires that the states obtain federal approval of their plans for use of
federal energy assistance funds before those funds are distributed. The
new program, known either as LIEAP or as the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), requires only that each state
provide "assurances" that its plan meets the specific requirements of the
statute.305 Although the state must "certify" its intention to conform to
the statutory criteria and to carry out its assurances, the statute explicitly
declares that "the Secretary may not prescribe the manner in which the
States will comply with the provisions of this subsection. '306
The legislative history behind these provisions makes it quite clear
that Congress intended to depart substantially from the 1981 strategy.
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, commenting on a
bill very similar to that which was finally enacted, emphasized the wide
discretion Congress wished the states to have: "[T]he committee intends
that States be provided with the broadest possible latitude in the use of
block grant funds and be free from all but the most minimal and necessary
federal administrative and regulatory direction. '307 It is difficult to imag-
ine a stronger mandate for a federal hands-off policy.0 8
301. Home Energy Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 96-223, Title III, 94 Stat. 229 (1980),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2611, 95 Stat. 902 (1981).
302. See infra text accompanying notes 307-08.
303. See supra text accompanying note 141 (regarding Carter proposal).
304. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8621(b) (West Supp. 1982).
305. Id. § 8624(a).
306. Id. § 8624(b).
307. S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 909 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEWS 933. The requirement for submission of a plan was designed to provide
the public and "secondarily the Secretary" of HHS, with a description of how the State
intends to satisfy the "assurances" contained in the application. Id. at 908, 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 932. The committee went on to add:
No provision for secretarial approval is provided or intended and no elaborate plans are contem-
plated, except when a State on its own initiative chooses to have one. Under no circumstances
does the committee want the Secretary to make normative judgments about a plan. Ultimately
the plan requirement is to create a public record, but one which is to be fluid to reflect changes
in the States [sic] needs and attitudes. Accordingly, the Governor may alter his State's plan at
any time and the deficiencies in a plan cannot, by itself [sic], be utilized as a basis for withholding
of a state's funds.
Id.
308. In keeping with this shift of authority to the states, reporting requirements to
(Vol. 7:371
HeinOnline  -- 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.  412 1983
Energy for the Poor
As noted above, the Act authorized annual funding at a level of
$1.875 billion. Congress, however, initially appropriated only $1.75 billion
for 1982, by means of a Continuing Resolution.30 9 In addition, not all of
that funding was made immediately available to the states. Despite in-
dications from Congress that it intended that the funds should be released
as needed to the states, the Administration withheld 10% of the initial
state allocations until March, after Congress had passed a supplemental
appropriation of $123 million, which brought the total to the authorized
level.310 Thus even though the basic legislation was in place in August,
1981, the states were left in considerable uncertainty well into the winter
regarding the precise level of funding they could expect. As a result,
many states devised programs based on overly conservative assumptions
regarding funding and accordingly reduced benefit levels and restricted
eligibility. 31t
The only regulations under the Act issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) are a set of procedural provisions
governing all seven HHS block grant programs. 312 As a graphic indication
of the Administration's dedication to removing federal restrictions on
certain state activities, regulations for the seven HHS block grants oc-
cupy only six pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, whereas regu-
lations for the predecessor programs totaled 318 pages. 313 Furthermore,
HHS reportedly "has declined not only to issue substantive guidance, or
enunciate model state approaches, but has even withheld views on the
legality of certain approaches when asked for them by the states. '314 This
the federal government also were considerably reduced. See HHS Block Grant Programs
Interim Final Rules, 45 C.F.R. § 96.82 (1982), 46 Fed. Reg. 48,583 (1981).
309. Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183, 1183-84(1981).
310. Appropriations Dept. of Labor Fiscal Year 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-147, 96 Stat.
4, 4 (1982); see Hill, supra note 141, at 226 n.37.
311. Hill, supra note 141, at 226-27; National Consumer Law Center, Key Energy
Developments Affecting Low-Income Consumers 3 (Oct. 5, 1982) (many states significantly
decreased their benefit levels or eligibility ceilings for the 1982 program, in "response to
fears of diminished funding from the federal government and poor planning in a number of
states.")
312. HHS Block Grant Programs Interim Final Rules, 45 C.F.R. part 96 (1982), 46
Fed. Reg. 48,583 (1981).
313. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: EARLY OBSERVATIONS ON BLOCK GRANT IMPLEMEN-
TATION 27 (1982).
314. Hill, supra note 141, at 225. Hill goes on to observe that this means
that the states, and beneficiaries, have been denied the accumulated wisdom and expertise of
HHS officials, developed over the last several years. This approach, coupled with the late release
of the evaluation of the 1980 program [see URaAN SYSTEMS REPORT, supra note 142] and only
limited information regarding the 1981 program, has effectively cut off states and interested
parties from an important body of valuable information on the development of state plans and
the implementation of state programs.
Id. at 223-24. See also 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,583 ("The Secretary is not prescribing any
particular format for the submission or elaborating its contents beyond what is specified in
the Act. Each State should simply insure that its submission satisfies the statutory
requirements.").
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federal deference has resulted in wide variations among programs even
in adjoining states.315
This increased flexibility for state energy assistance activities exists
within a statutory scheme that is substantively very similar to the 1981
program legislation. The new Act distributes grants among the states
according to the same formula as for 1981.316 Although the primary
emphasis remains preventive energy assistance, the Act allows the states
more latitude in allocating funds for emergency needs. The previous three
percent limit on state reserves for emergency funds is replaced by a
provision stating that "a reasonable amount based on data from prior
years shall be reserved by each State for energy crisis intervention. 3 7
Neither the Act nor the block grant regulations defines "reasonable
amount," and the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee indi-
cated that the exact amount would be up to the state's discretion. 318 CSA
will no longer undertake any energy assistance functions, or any others
for that matter; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act eliminated CSA
altogether as of October 1, 1981.319
In accordance with the general thrust of the block grant approach,
the Act gives states increased discretion over distributing funds among
various kinds of low-income assistance activities. For example, a state
may use up to fifteen percent of its allocation for weatherization or
energy-related home repair.32 Almost all of the states exercised this
option to some extent, with the total amount of funds transferred to
weatherization or repair activities probably amounting to between $170
million and $184 million. 321 Perhaps even more indicative of the increased
state discretion is the option for a state to transfer up to ten percent of
its LIHEAP funds to one or more of the six other HHS block grant
programs. 322
315. National Consumer Law Center, supra note 311, at 3.
316. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 8623(a) (West Supp. 1982) with LIEAP, supra note 237,
§ 306(a), 94 Stat. at 289-91 (discussed supra notes 258-63). As in the prior year, the 1982
Act has a provision for realloting funds that the Secretary determines will not be used by
a state during the fiscal year. 42 U.S.C. § 8626(b)(1). A new feature, however, is that a
state may now request that up to 25% of its funds be held until the following fiscal year.
42 U.S.C.A. § 8626(b)(2); see also 45 C.F.R. § 96.14(b) (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,588.
317. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8623(c). See supra text accompanying note 261.
318. S. REP. No. 139, supra note 307, at 909, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CoNo. &
AD. NEws at 933.
319. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2611, 95 Stat. at 902 (1981); see HHS REPORT TO CONGRESS,
supra note 239, at 44 n.1.
320. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(k).
321. See National Consumer Law Center, Analysis of State Exercise of the Weath-
erization/Repair Option under the Energy Assistance Program 1 (Nov. 10, 1982).
322. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8623(f). HHS has estimated that about $99 million would be
transferred out of LIHEAP in 1982 under this option. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Results of the July Telephone Survey on the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program 3 (Aug. 20, 1982). This report also estimates heating assistance under LIHEAP's
first year at $1.164 billion, cooling assistance at $77 million, and crisis assistance at $147
million. Id. at 5-7. A listing of the other block grants appears at HHS Block Grant Programs
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As in the 1981 program, eligibility is based upon two major ap-
proaches. Households including recipients of AFDC, SSI, Food Stamps,
and certain veterans benefits are automatically eligible. 323 Other house-
holds are eligible if their income falls below one hundred fifty percent of
the poverty level for each state or sixty percent of the state's median
income. 324 The .states retain the freedom to determine the precise eligi-
bility level, provided it remains within the statutory ceiling. 325 As in the
earlier statute, LIHEAP still requires that the highest level of assistance
be furnished to households with the lowest incomes and the highest
energy costs in relation to income. 326
The new Act does not contain the previous guidance on factors the
states should consider in computing benefits. 327 It does, however, retain
the "income disregard" provision: LIHEAP benefits may not be consid-
ered income for other purposes, such as taxation and determining eligi-
bility for other assistance programs. 328 This approach did not continue
without dispute, as the Senate version of the 1982 legislation originally
had not contained such a provision.329
In most other respects, the 1982 legislation follows the substantive
direction of the prior year. The 1982 program still allows cooling assis-
tance and no longer even restricts the circumstances under which it can
be given. 330 States may still make payments directly to eligible households
or to suppliers of energy,331 but the Act omitted the extensive termination
protections found in the 1981 legislation. 332 Renters are still entitled to
be treated "equitably. '333
Finally, the states must still provide for public participation in the
development of their plans. 334 Although public hearings are not statutorily
required for the 1982 plans, they are required for the succeeding years
of funding under the Act. 335 This greater emphasis on public involvement
Interim Final Rules, 45 C.F.R. part 96 (1982), 46 Fed. Reg. 48,583 (1981). Funds may also
be transferred from those other programs to LIHEAP. See National Consumer Law Center,
Energy Assistance Update #18, 4 (Aug. 12, 1981).
323. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(b)(2)(A).
324. Id. § 8624(b)(2)(B).
325. Many states set ceilings at 125% of the poverty level, while some opted to
restrict their basic programs to households which are categorically eligible. Hill, supra note
141, at 226; National Consumer Law Center, supra note 311, at 3.
326. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(b)(5).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 266-89.
328. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(f).
329. See Hill, supra note 141, at 224.
330. The statute broadly alms "to assist eligible households to meet the costs of home
energy," with "home energy" being defined as a "source of heating or cooling in residential
dwellings." 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8621(a), 8622(3).
331. Id. § 8624(b)(7)
332. See supra text accompanying notes 285-86.
333. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(b)(8). In addition, payments will no longer be made directly
to building operators under federally assisted housing programs. Id. Cf. supra note 238.
334. Id. § 8624(b)(12).
335. Id. § 8624(a)(2); see also 46 Fed. Reg. at 48,583.
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in the formulation of the plans may be seen as a counterweight to the
diminished federal supervision. The statutory language urging the states,
when designating administering agencies, to give "special consideration"
to local agencies previously involved in energy assistance or weatheri-
zation further evinces a shift away from centralized federal control. 336
3. The 1982 Program in Perspective
Despite the markedly reduced federal involvement in energy assis-
tance under the new Act, Congress's commitment to energy assistance
appears strong. That commitment is reflected in the retention of the major
substantive features of the 1981 approach, in the multi-year authorization,
and in the appropriation of the entire authorized amount for fiscal 1982.
It could be argued, on the other hand, that an authorization that provides
the same funding for three years ignores likely energy price increases
and thus guarantees inadequate benefits.
Despite Congress's commitment, the Reagan Administration contin-
ues to be reluctant even to seek funding at the authorized level. The
Administration's budget proposal for fiscal 1983 included only $1.26 bil-
lion for energy assistance. 337 The Administration again urged that this
program should be merged into a block grant with other emergency
assistance at a total funding of $1.3 billion. 338 In setting funding for fiscal
year 1983, however, Congress showed little interest in the reiterated
Reagan approach. A Continuing Resolution initially provided 1983 fund-
ing for LIHEAP at the 1982 level,339 and in December 1982 Congress
raised this amount to $1.975 billion, largely in response to recent natural
gas price increases. 340 Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration budget
proposal for fiscal 1984 has again requested only $1.3 billion for energy
assistance. 341
III. THE POLICY PREMISES OF ENERGY ASSISTANCE
A. Alleviation of Poverty as an End in Itself
Energy assistance efforts from 1973 through 1979 were closely tied
to the federal anti-poverty program. They embodied the premise that
336. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8624(b)(6).
337. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 291, at 5-159 to -160.
338. See id. See also Budget Message of President, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRs. Doc.
129, 138 (Feb. 15, 1982).
339. Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186, 1187 (1982).
340. Pub. L. No. 97-377, 96 Stat. 1830, 1891 (authorizing $1.850 billion for LIHEAP),
1918 (authorizing additional $.025 billion for LIHEAP), 1923 (authorizing additional $.1
billion for LIHEAP, for a total authorization of $1.975 billion) (1982); see H.R. REP. No.
980, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1982); National Consumer Law Center, Low Income Energy
Assistance Update #32, at 2 (Dec. 28, 1982); Gasflation: A Cold, Costly Winter Ahead,
TIME, Nov. 8, 1982, at 56.
341. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 5-113 (1983).
[Vol. 7:371
HeinOnline  -- 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.  416 1983
Energy for the Poor
alleviating poverty in this country is in itself a worthy end. At times, as
from 1977 to 1979, the emphasis has been on alleviating the most extreme
hardships: those that accompany weather emergencies and some house-
holds' resulting inability to obtain the minimum energy needed for sur-
vival. At other times, such as under the 1981 Home Energy Assistance
Act, programs have emphasized more general income maintenance. Such
programs recognize that high energy prices make it difficult, even in
ordinary weather, for poor people to meet their energy needs and to pay
for other goods and services, many of which are more costly as a result
of energy price rises.
This premise corresponds to the statutory declaration in the original
Economic Opportunity Act that everyone should have "the opportunity
to live in decency and dignity. '342 Under this view, some minimum
amount of energy must be available to satisfy the basic needs of every
individual. More recently, the Reagan Administration has characterized
the energy needs of the poor as "a broad social problem that does not
relate exclusively to energy," one that is "best addressed by agencies
most sensitive to people's overall income and housing needs. '343 This
recent return to the earlier stance is illustrated both by the emphasis on
state and local decisionmaking found in the 1982 Act, and by the Reagan
Administration's proposal to combine energy assistance with other forms
of emergency assistance for the poor. The attempt to eliminate the "in-
come disregard" provision in the current legislation also suggests this
direction, for it would have the effect of lumping energy assistance ben-
efits together with other kinds of income maintenance payments. 344
In the broadest sense, this first premise simply reflects an unwilling-
ness to allow the conditions of poverty, including the unavailability of
minimum energy, to continue without an ongoing community effort to
alleviate them. This premise fostered the federal government's initial
involvement in energy assistance, and it has continued to have an im-
portant role in shaping the programs. It has influenced the choice of
administering agencies for energy assistance, with OEO-CSA and the
local community action agencies being the preferred agencies from 1973
through 1980. 345 This premise also has significant implications for deter-
mining appropriate funding levels, but the specific implications depend
largely on empirical data, such as the number of people who face sub-
stantial difficulty in meeting basic energy needs, and the overall costs of
meeting those needs. Collecting reliable data on these questions is ob-
viously problematic, as is obtaining full funding to meet the entire need
identified. Other issues, such as the fairest source of the money and the
342. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
343. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 245, at 12.
344. See Center for The Study of Social Policy, Profiles of Families in Poverty:
Effects of the FY 1983 Budget Proposals on the Poor (Feb. 25, 1982); Petrini, supra note
245, at 16-17.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 319.
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soundest means of distributing it, also are not illuminated by this crite-
rion. Nonetheless, the alleviation of poverty continues to be one of the
strongest premises underlying energy assistance programs.
B. Alleviation of Hardships Caused by Explicit Energy Policy Choices
One particularly troubling aspect of the burden of high energy prices
on the poor is that the burden appears to result largely from deliberate
congressional and presidential policy choices to rely upon replacement-
cost pricing for energy.3 46 Compelling national interests, it is now widely
agreed, call for terminating energy price controls and their counterprod-
uctive effects on conservation and domestic energy supply. 47 After con-
trols are removed, domestic production should increase, both in tradi-
tional fuels and in new energy resources, and energy prices should
eventually stabilize and perhaps even fall. Until that goal is reached,
however, this premise dictates that the poor should not be saddled with
a new burden on top of those they already bear.
In implementing this policy shift, decisionmakers have found them-
selves choosing to make their constituents' lives more difficult in the
short term, with only a long-range prospect of increased domestic supply
offered to ease the pain. A basic tenet of American government is that
our elected representatives should act for the public welfare. Present
energy policy thus creates a dilemma because the long-term public wel-
fare conflicts with the short-term welfare of the most economically dis-
advantaged segment of our society. Energy assistance efforts have been
initiated to help reduce the short-term burdens and thus obviate this
dilemma.
Even if it were argued that the poor are not so much bearing a new
burden as losing the privilege of energy subsidies, we may still realisti-
cally respond that the poor needed the subsidies and came to rely upon
them much more than other groups. This second major policy premise
thus declares that we must provide energy assistance in order to escape
the dilemma and avoid creating disasterous consequences for the well-
being of many Americans through explicit government policy choices.
As one Senator put it, "[tihose of us who favor decontrol have a special
obligation to limit adverse impacts on the poor. '348
346. See supra text accompanying note 136. Within the first month of his incumbency,
President Reagan accelerated oil price decontrol. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg.
9909 (1981). See also supra note 2.
347. See sources cited supra note 6; see also ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY,
supra note 4, at xii.
348. 125 CONG. REC. S16,843 (daily ed. Nov.16, 1979) (statement of Sen. Long); see
also 125 CONG. REc. S17,752 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) ("We have a
moral responsibility .... We must act now to assure that the burdens of energy costs do
not overcome the resources of individual Americans."); 125 CONG. REC. S16,850 (daily ed.
Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum) ("Decontrol ... says to the weakest and
the most vulnerable members of our society that the main thrust of this Nation's effort to
save energy is to price them out of the market.").
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Just precisely how this "special obligation" should be discharged is
not readily apparent. Logically, assistance efforts should alleviate only
those new energy price burdens that can be attributed to government
policy choices, such as oil and natural gas decontrol. This implication of
the second premise stands in contrast to the first premise's emphasis
upon alleviating the conditions of poverty, including basic energy cost
burdens that the poor cannot meet regardless of the origin of those
burdens.
Commentators have offered several proposals for identifying the
extent of the energy burden to which the "special obligation" should
apply. One frequently stated view is that "[tihe poor should not suffer
more than the rest of society while the economic system adjusts to higher
energy prices . 349 Another formulation holds that the poor should receive
enough aid to "keep them even with the decrease in their real income
caused by past and future energy price increases. '350
Some observers also have recognized that recent energy assistance
programs have not clearly articulated whether their objective is "to help
low income people cope with the recent rise in energy prices or is...
to assuage the perceived high absolute cost of energy .... ,,35" These
contrasting emphases have distinct implications for determining eligibility
for energy assistance and for setting the proper benefit levels over a
period of years.3 12 These complexities highlight the fact that acceptance
of this second premise as a justification for energy aid does not eliminate
the necessity for extensive data on actual needs for assistance and on
the probable impacts of various program formats.
C. Protection of Americans from Foreign Price Control
The energy supply and price disruptions of the past decade have
illustrated the great degree to which the cost and availability of petro-
leum, and occasionally even of natural gas, depend on the actions of
One study has concluded that a similar stance is also mandated as a practical or
political matter: "any attempt to deny that a problem exists for the poor... will invite a
renewed deadlock on price regulation .... In the final analysis, we cannot expect the poor
in this country to support a free-market pricing policy for energy unless the nation is willing
to cushion them against the effects of those higher prices." The study adds, "Any other
policy is unfair." ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 4, at 16-17.
349. ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 4, at 17.
350. Id. Presumably programs for keeping the poor "even" with their own loss of
real income resulting from higher energy prices would also satisfy the goal of making sure
that the poor do not suffer disproportionately. Assuming that the rest of the public would
not be similarly aided in staying "even," however, other groups actually might end up
bearing a greater relative portion of energy cost increases than would the poor. Equal
treatment for the poor would then become preferred treatment, which may be justifiable
under the first premise, but logically is not called for under the second.
351. A. COHEN & K. HOLLENBECK, supra note 9, at 39 (emphasis in original).
352. Id. at 39-44. ("An equitable benefit level structure would take both the rise in
price and the level of cost into account. The use of the rise in price would reflect the
unanticipated burdens suddenly inflicted upon people. The use of the level of cost would
reflect the movement towards a longer-run equilibrium." Id. at 44 (emphasis in original)).
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foreign powers. A third premise underlying energy assistance for the
poor is the need to protect Americans from foreign control of major
aspects of their living conditions. The need for "energy independence"
has become a central feature of U.S. energy policy. The energy assistance
efforts similarly seem at times to be grounded in the notion that foreign
energy producers should not be permitted to inflict real suffering on any
American. This premise offers a partial justification for assistance and
helps illuminate the timing and amount of such aid.
Both President Carter's 1977 proposal for a revised emergency as-
sistance program,3 53 and his mid-1979 increase in assistance proposals
following large OPEC price hikes,354 suggest that this premise was op-
erating. Policies designed to further this premise presumably would re-
quire action on an ad hoc basis each time foreign powers raise prices or
tighten supplies. The resulting burden on those harmed most then should
be alleviated. 355
D. Redistribution of Undeservedly High Profits
The link that President Carter envisioned between revenues gener-
ated by the crude oil windfall profits tax and energy assistance programs
suggests that income redistribution has also been a motivating factor in
energy assistance. Beginning with the 1980 program, the premise that it
is unfair for some groups to profit greatly from higher energy prices while
others suffer extreme hardship from the same cause began to influence
policy greatly. 356
353. See supra text accompanying note 58-61.
354. See supra text accompanying note 140.
355. Arguably this justification would call for help to all affected Americans, not just
the poor. When the limits on available funds are recalled, and when this premise is seen in
conjunction with the first premise for the alleviation of the conditions of poverty, the choice
to help only those hardest hit by foreign control becomes more understandable.
356. This argument can derive some support, and perhaps greater precision, from
theories in the domain of welfare economics. As noted above, the energy assistance problem
reflects a policy dilemma in which long-term public welfare goals conflict with the short-
term basic welfare needs of the poor. See supra text accompanying notes 347-48. The
dilemma is aggravated because the added burden on the poor is mirrored by increased
profits of the oil producers. Economic theory, however, readily recognizes that "most
economic decisions involve just such combinations of loss and gain." C. PRICE, WELFARE
ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (1977).
One approach to evaluation of these decisions is the Kaldor-Hicks compensation
criterion.
Kaldor argued that... if as a result of some policy some people are made economically better
off while some others are made worse off than before it might still be possible for the economist
to make a value-free recommendation of the policy provided the gainers were able to compensate
the losers and yet be better off themselves than they had been originally. Kaldor went on to
elaborate that whether the compensation was actually paid or not was a political or ethical
decision. However, the possibility of adequately compensating the losers established, for him,
the potential superiority of the policy under discussion.
S. NATH, A REAPPRAISAL OF WELFARE ECONOMICS 95-96 (1969) (emphasis in original).
This proposition has received considerable later refinement. Id. at 96-101; see also W.
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There are two major ways of explaining this premise. First, it can
be seen as a pragmatic concern. Under the first or second premises
discussed above, high energy prices create a need for assistance for poor
people; the windfall profits of oil producers offer a convenient source of
funds for this purpose. Presumably producers will not miss the money
lost through the new tax. The new profits did not exist before decontrol
and should not have been anticipated, given that they resulted from
domestic government actions and peremptory OPEC determinations.3 57
The second possible view of this premise is that windfall profits
simply should not be permitted. 358 Although the proceeds from a tax to
recapture windfall profits could be applied to any worthy cause, the
energy needs of the poor are a logical or at least somewhat symmetrical
repository. This perspective has radical implications, for windfall gains
are a central feature of many speculative business and investment activ-
ities. Accordingly, this approach is unlikely to gain widespread accept-
ance in this country. Nonetheless, the development of the crude oil
windfall profits tax suggests a congressional sentiment that it just was
not fair for businesses suddenly to receive apparently vast monetary
benefits from foreign manipulations and domestic government energy
policies.359
BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 162-65 (1967). It also
has been criticized, particularly because it justifies policy changes on the basis of possible
compensation, but without requiring such compensation actually to be undertaken. See
Zeckhauser & Schaefer, Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory, in THE STUDY
OF POLICY FORMATION 27, 59 (R. Bauer & K. Gergen eds.) (1966).
This analysis seems to support the argument, under either the second or the fourth
premise, that the added energy burden on the poor should be ameliorated. Given Congress's
failure to appropriate funds out of the windfall profits tax revenues at the levels originally
authorized, it is somewhat striking that Congress, in effect, followed the Kaldor-Hicks
approach quite literally: it estimated what adequate compensation out of those revenues
could be, but failed to make the hypothetically preferred solution a reality.
357. This explanation probably conforms most closely to the thinking of President
Carter and the Congress in enacting the new tax and making a gesture in the direction of
a link between the tax revenues and energy assistance.
Similar suggestions for a windfall profits tax on some natural gas producers are
surfacing now regarding the prospect that complete, expedited decontrol of natural gas will
be implemented, see supra note 2. See Natural Gas Working Group, Memorandum for the
Cabinet Council on Natural Resources and the Environment (Jan. 4, 1983), reprinted in 11
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 55 (Jan. 13, 1983).
358. One recent study suggests that oil company profits resulting from decontrol have
been applied to purposes very different from the main intended objective of promoting
increased domestic exploration and production. Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, Spending
the Windfall: An Analysis of Post-Decontrol Oil Company Acquisitions and Investments I
(Research Report by the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition, June 28, 1982). The accuracy of
this report has been disputed. See [10 Curr. Rep.] ENERGY USERS REPORT (BNA) 719
(July 8, 1982).
359.
The impetus for this legislative endeavor was the President's decision to decontrol crude oil, an
action which will ultimately result in tremendous financial gain for some, and hardship to others.
Therefore, the committee set out to devise a plan to be implemented through our system of
taxation which would rectify some of the injustices which would otherwise result.
125 CONG. REC. S16,550 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bradley).
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One obvious implication of this premise - whether it is viewed as
identifying a convenient source of funds or as a broader economic prin-
ciple - is that the source of energy aid for the poor becomes readily
discernable. This premise also has implications for the method of calcu-
lating the overall level of energy assistance: the question becomes not
how much assistance is needed, but rather what portion of the producers'
profits is undeserved. The complex formulae of the crude oil windfall
profits tax illustrate that the latter determination is a very difficult one to
make.36o
E. Allocation of Social Welfare Decisions to the Local Level
The Reagan Administration proposals for 1982, and LIHEAP as
enacted for that year, emphasized state and local control of decision-
making for energy assistance and other social programs. The proposals
focused on the organization of power and responsibilities as among the
federal, state, and local governments. The underlying premise was that
social welfare decisions should be made at local levels because decision-
makers there would be closer to and therefore more sensitive to people's
needs. 361 This premise is probably the most purely instrumental of the
six premises discussed. It addresses only the format of energy assistance
and not its basic desirability. Nonetheless, this premise was a major
influence on the LIHEAP legislation for 1982-84.
Although this shift in responsibilities toward more localized deci-
sionmaking is now usually considered an outgrowth of conservative po-
litical thinking about federalism, the effect may strongly resemble a return
to the original poverty program approach. The 1982 program's urging of
"special consideration" for continued use of local poverty agencies illus-
trates this.362 As mentioned in the discussion of the first premise, the
suggestions for merging energy assistance with other types of emergency
aid also point in the same direction.3 63 The result is that "the problem of
energy assistance merges into that of alleviating poverty generally. ' '364
Accordingly, this premise points not only toward a shift in decisionmak-
ing power, but also toward recasting the energy problem in the broader
context of poverty.
360. See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 102, 94
Stat. 229, 255-56 (1980), repealed in part by Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2611, 95 Stat. 902 (1981).
See R. PIERCE, G. ALLISON, & P. MARTIN, ECONOMIC REGULATION: ENERGY, TRANSPOR-
TATION AND UTILITIES 673 (1980).
361. See supra text accompanying note 298; see also H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT,
supra note 4, at 75 ("Each state government would decide how to help the disadvantaged
within its own borders withstand the buffeting of rising energy prices.").
362. See supra text accompanying note 35.
363. See supra text accompanying note 343.
364. H. LANDSBERG & J. DUKERT, supra note 4, at 76.
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F. Balancing Alleviation of Current Need with Maximum Long-Term
Reduction of Need
The sixth and last premise is that a balance should be struck between
energy assistance and conservation efforts. Some argue that the best way
to help the poor cope with high energy costs is to provide just enough
direct aid to alleviate extreme current suffering, while providing as much
aid as possible for long-term reduction of energy needs.365 Putting this
premise into effect would require extensive information on the levels of
basic energy needs in different localities. It would also require that direct
assistance be strictly limited to meeting those levels. All additional avail-
able funds would go for long-term efforts such as residential weatheri-
zation and alternative transportation methods. 366 This kind of thinking
underlies the various approaches taken to mixing and transferring funds
between the energy assistance and weatherization programs.
This premise is largely instrumental in character. It could be viewed
as a means of implementing the first premise - that of alleviating hard-
ship as an end in itself - but the first premise blends the energy burden
into the overall poverty problem, whereas this premise approaches the
energy problems of the poor as a part of the overall national effort to
promote conservation and reduce energy demand. It thus is more closely
akin to the second premise, which views energy assistance as necessary
for mitigation of the hardships of national energy policy. In effect, the
sixth premise would call for a somewhat less charitable view of the degree
to which current hardships must be ameliorated than would the first
premise.
This last premise has been an intermittent aspect of the energy
assistance programs of the past decade. The early EECS efforts wrestled
with the problem of allocating funds between weatherization and crisis
intervention needs.3 67 More recently, the option in LIHEAP for transfer
365. Targeting extensive efforts at the poor is not necessarily the best strategy for
conserving energy; energy use patterns of other sectors of society may be much more
susceptible to substantial reductions. R. PERLMAN & R. WARREN, supra note 4, at 139-40
("In the long run, policies addressed to further reductions in energy consumption among
higher income families will produce far greater results than trying to cut down on low and
moderate income households.") (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, reducing energy usage
by the poor does benefit them by reducing their energy costs and may also boost the
national conservation effort.
366. A thoughtful proposal for allocating funds to achieve this sort of balance is
contained in M. Power & J. Eisenberg, The Future of Low Income Energy Programs: The
Need and the Options (paper presented at Santa Cruz, California at the 1982 Summer Study
of the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Aug. 24, 1982). A key feature
of the proposal is that energy assistance funds allocated to a state will be reduced over the
course of years "by the savings it could have achieved under an optimal weatherization
strategy." Id. at 10. A more fully elaborated program is set out in CONSUMER ENERGY
COUNCIL OF AMERICA, supra note 10, at 61-89 ("The model maintains a relatively high
level of assistance for all households, although some benefits must be foregone in the
present in order to achieve greater benefits in the future." Id. at 78.)
367. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
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of up to fifteen percent of funds to weatherization and energy-related
home repair indicates that this search for a balance is still an important
part of the overall effort to aid the poor.368
IV. ENERGY EQUITY AS A SYNTHESIS OF CONCERNS
The six policy premises identified here are those that have had the
greatest impact on the formation of energy assistance programs over the
past decade. These premises will undoubtedly continue to shape policy
in the future, perhaps with the added influence of new concerns that have
not yet come to light. Just as each of the programs thus far has embodied
overlapping objectives, future program design similarly will be based on
a synthesis of concerns.
The process of policy design and implementation of course will
continue to be affected by political, economic, and budgetary consider-
ations that may frequently frustrate a rational approach.3 69 Chaotic as the
decisionmaking process of government may be, it is still important to
understand the multiple values at work in these decisions, particularly
the premises most relevant to the problems at hand. Only through careful
attention to these premises can rational policy design be achieved.
Although future legislators and administrators will strike different
balances among the concerns relevant to energy assistance, it is none-
theless possible to suggest a synthesis. This synthesis should provide a
realistic, practical, and enduring perspective from which specific program
details can be developed. It is not possible here to identify all such details,
though some major program implications can be discerned. This recom-
mended synthesis is obviously not the only possible blend of policy
premises. It is not only inevitable but desirable in a democratic society
that future decisionmakers should reconcile these concerns in different
ways over time, according to the perceived necessities and values pre-
dominant at the moment of legislative choice.
Although it is tempting to emphasize the first premise - the allevia-
tion of poverty as an end in itself - as the overriding goal of energy
assistance, there are serious risks in doing so. Such a perspective would
tend to equate the energy burden problem with other aspects of poverty
that government and community leaders have been largely unable to
alleviate. We are not conceptually compelled to view high energy prices
primarily in the context of poverty and avoiding that perspective allows
368. See supra text accompanying note 320.
369. Many commentators have argued forcefully that woefully inadequate funds are
being devoted to energy assistance. See, e.g., ENERGY PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 4, at 16 (suggesting approximately $5 billion per year needed); FOMAC REPORT, supra
note 4, at 51 (suggesting $5.1 billion per year needed); STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note 4. at 5, 54 ("The loss of purchasing power of the poor
not offset by energy assistance programs [during 1979-81] was $11.1 billion, or 76 percent
of the total loss.").
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us to obtain a more precise picture of the nature of the problem and its
possible solutions.
One of the features of the energy burden that distinguishes it from
other problems of poverty is its relatively recent origin. Unlike some
aspects of poverty such as housing, education, and employment, the
energy cost problem has only been severe for about a decade. More
importantly, its solution may come about, at least in part, through a
combination of technological advances, increased domestic production,
and major shifts in population densities in various parts of the country
within a few decades. Additionally, unlike other basic human needs such
as food, housing, and health care, energy demand can be substantially
reduced through conservation efforts. Evidence is mounting that tech-
nology and common sense could permit most energy consumers to live
comfortably with much less energy. 370 Whether or not this conclusion is
valid for the poor is not yet known, but preliminary indications of the
effectiveness of conservation programs among poor households warrant
continued pursuit of this approach. 371 Accordingly, to view energy assis-
tance as just one more antipoverty tool is to overlook the distinctive
features of the problem, as well as the possible unique and separate
avenues to its solution.
The second premise, calling for the alleviation of hardships caused
by explicit energy policy choices, offers a much sounder orientation for
energy assistance. It recognizes that the nation is apparently in a period
of transition leading to the achievement of our national energy goals, and
that, during this time, we should minimize the hardships on the people
who otherwise would suffer most severely from our new national direc-
tion. This emphasis would eliminate the lingering confusion over whether
energy assistance is to be labelled a "one time" exercise each year - as
it was during the first few years - or a "permanent" program, which
early efforts explicitly disavowed, but the Carter proposals explicitly
accepted. The second premise calls for neither of these extremes, but
rather for a transitional program that would last as long as it takes to
achieve the national energy objectives.
Under this premise the energy assistance issue can be seen as a facet
of national energy policy. If conservation efforts and increased domestic
production can reduce demand and increase supply, prices should sta-
bilize and fall. This would alleviate the energy burden on all Americans,
including the poor. If instead it should become clear that the national
energy program cannot attain these goals, it would then be appropriate
to reconsider approaching the the energy burden problem as another,
370. See, e.g., R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 136-82.
371. See generally CONSUMER ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 10. Another, minor
distinguishing feature of the energy problem is its substantial weather-dependence. This
obviously creates greater needs and hardship at some times, but also permits suffering to
be avoided at much less expense when a mild winter or moderate summer comes along.
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lingering aspect of poverty. It would be premature, and probably self-
defeating, to do so now.
This approach has several identifiable program implications. It is
preferable to keep management of energy assistance programs separate
from the administration of other income maintenance efforts, thus focus-
ing attention on the distinctive aspects of the problem and its possible
solutions. This does not mean, however, that energy assistance programs
should shun the use of methods such as categorical eligibility mechanisms
for promoting administrative efficiency. If such methods can help identify
suitable recipients in an economical and timely way, programs should
use them.
Another implication of this approach is that most energy assistance
should be channeled through devices such as vendor payments, two-
party checks, and vouchers, all of which have been used widely in recent
years. Although this does have a certain paternalistic aspect, it again
serves the important goal of keeping energy assistance benefits linked to
energy needs, and, ultimately, to national energy policy.
Finally, perhaps the most important implication of adopting an ap-
proach based on the second premise is the appropriateness of linking to
it the sixth premise, which seeks a balance between short-term and long-
term energy needs. As has been noted above, both of these premises
tend to view the energy problem for the poor as a part of the overall
national energy picture.3 72 Striking this balance can be viewed as one of
the most important and difficult tasks in furtherance of the goals of the
second premise.
The remaining premises should be seen as supplementing this main
focus. The alleviation of poverty must certainly remain a background
concern during the transition to a new energy future. Decisionmakers
should not fail to recognize that high energy prices tend to merge into
the overall hardships of poverty for many Americans. This recognition,
however, should not become the major shaping influence on policy.
Similarly, adopting an approach primarily based on the fourth prem-
ise - linking energy assistance with taxation of undeservedly high profits
- would be to risk considerable confusion and failure. Even accepting
the pragmatic interpretation of that premise, revenue sources such as the
windfall profits tax on oil are not reliable foundations for energy assis-
tance. For one thing extraneous fiscal concerns may work to reduce the
tax.373 Shifting petroleum market forces may diminish these revenues
considerably. They may also deprive the windfall profits notion of some
of its earlier appeal if profits should fall because oil producers need to
replenish inventories at higher cost during times of diminished demand.
Perhaps most significantly, the fourth premise diverts attention from the
372. See supra text accompanying notes 352, 366.
373. Furthermore, a recent court decision has found the tax unconstitutional on
wholly unrelated grounds. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983) (No. 82-1066).
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issue of national energy policy choices and societal responsibility to those
suffering most from those choices. Consideration should be given to this
premise only with recognition that it is supplementary and instrumental
in nature, suggesting one source for energy assistance funding, but not a
necessary or exclusive source.
The third premise, relating to foreign control of energy prices, also
should be seen as subsidiary. The energy price problem is not necessarily
episodic or sporadic in character, as reliance on this premise assumes.
It is probably even safe to speculate that if OPEC were to disband now,
American energy policy and the needs of the poor would not be funda-
mentally changed.374 Furthermore, some experts believe that domestic
energy pricing policies have caused a greater percentage of the recent
increase in energy costs than have foreign price manipulations.3 75 This
premise thus should come into play only in a supplementary role, influ-
encing the timing and amount of energy assistance when distinct foreign
price developments cause harsh impacts here.
The fifth premise, regarding allocation of social decisions to the local
level, should also continue to be viewed as instrumental. It should not
detract from the basic justification of energy assistance programs found
in the second premise. In theory, the fifth premise is neutral regarding
the goals of energy assistance, simply leaving it to state and local gov-
ernment to clarify and implement whatever goals are chosen. This con-
cern thus need not present an obstacle to fulfillment of the "special
obligation" under the second premise, provided state and local decision-
makers shape their program decisions in accordance with the purposes
of that premise as supplemented by the sixth premise.
In this regard, the 1982 and later Reagan Administration proposals
for energy assistance are cause for concern. As discussed above, these
proposals have tended to merge energy assistance into the poverty prob-
lem.376 The federalism concerns of the fifth premise can and should be
addressed within the context of energy assistance efforts linked to the
broad national energy objectives emphasized by the second premise. The
federalism debate must not blur those objectives and throw the energy
assistance effort back into the broad antipoverty format.
CONCLUSION
The synthesis just described attempts to harmonize the six premises
that have shaped the past decade of energy assistance programs. The
374. See Mixed Barrel: Possible Oil-Price Drop is Welcomed or Feared, Depending
on Outlook: OPEC's Disarray Threatens World's Banking System, But Consumers May
Gain, Wall Street J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
375. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., supra note
4, at 4 ("The major oil price increases of the 1979-1981 period were primarily due to
domestic oil pricing decisions - not high oil import costs.").
376. See supra text accompanying notes 362-64.
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synthesis further attempts to provide a sound direction for future policy
development. It postulates that social justice requires a national com-
mitment to bear collectively the transitional burden of the new energy
policy path we have chosen, rather than to let this burden fall unmitigated
on the poor. By linking energy aid to that choice, this approach is most
likely to provide a clear perspective on the distinctive causes and solu-
tions of the energy burden problem.
Whether this synthesis or some other blend of policy premises is
adopted by decisionmakers charged with designing energy aid for the
poor, careful attention must be given to the critical social issues these
premises represent. Thorough evaluation of these premises and their
relationships will contribute to rational policy development, for they have
critical implications for the substance and form of energy equity for the
poor.
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